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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

V,

:

JACK D. BROCKSMITH,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 930146-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from judgment and sentence entered upon
unconditional pleas of guilty to six counts of communications
fraud, all second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-1801 (1990)-1
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Defendant claims to challenge the propriety of the
trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas,
claiming that withdrawal was warranted based on the State's
alleged violation of: 1) defendant's statutory speedy trial
rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Utah Code
Ann. § 77-29-5, et seq. (1990); 2) defendant's constitutional
speedy trial rights under the state and federal constitutions;

x

After commission of the offenses in this case, and before
entry of defendant's guilty pleas, section 76-10-1801 was amended,
effective April 23, 1990. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (Supp.
1993). The amendment is not relevant to this case.

and 3) defendant's due process and equal protection rights, which
were violated by the State's alleged failure to comply with
various procedural laws and rules.
Appellate courts review a trial court's ultimate
decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea using an
abuse of discretion standard, while the underlying factual
findings will not beset aside unless they are clearly erroneous.
State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 670 (Utah App. 1993) . However,
this Court need not review the merits of any of defendant's
claims because: 1) defendant waived the issues, both expressly
and by entry of his unconditional guilty pleas, State ex rel.
E.G.T., 808 P.2d 138, 139 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Sery, 758
P.2d 935, 937-38 (Utah App. 1988); 2) he failed to advance any of
the arguments in support of his motion to withdraw his pleas
below; and 3) he fails to allege either plain error or
exceptional circumstances to excuse his waiver.

State v.

Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 705 n.2 (Utah App. 1993); State v.
Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 (Utah App. 1992); State v.
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 925 (Utah App. 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The text of any relevant constitutional, statutory, or
rule provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issue
presented on appeal is contained in either the body or the
addendum of this brief.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Because the chronology of the proceedings in this
matter is critical in applying the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers Act (IAD), the relevant dates and corresponding facts
are as follows:2
July 11, 1989

Defendant is arrested in Utah on an
Illinois warrant for felony theft (R. 241-42,
287-89, 297, 595).

Aug. 14, 1989

A governor's warrant is issued in Utah (R.
242, 292) .

Aug. 25, 1989

Utah's circuit court issues an order
releasing def to Illinois authorities (R.
242, 293). Defendant remains in Utah to
participate in plea negotiations relating to
anticipated Utah felony charges (242, 297
-99) .

Oct. 5, 1989

Pursuant to the plea negotiations, Utah files
an information and an affidavit of probable
cause (case no. 891001140), charging
defendant with nineteen counts of
communications fraud and theft by deception
(R. 242-43, 298-99, 595).

Oct. 10, 1989

Defendant is bound over to district court (R.
243) .

Oct. 19, 1989

Defendant is arraigned (case no. 891000111
FS) (R. 243, 299). Instead of pleading
guilty as he had agreed, he enters a plea of
not guilty (R. 243, 299, 513, 595; Transcript
of September 24, 1992, hearing [hereinafter
"Tr.»] at 28-29) .

Oct. 24, 1989

Counsel for the parties conduct a joint
telephone conversation in which defendant's
counsel says defendant does not object to
entry of an ex parte order of dismissal
without prejudice, sought by the State

2

Because the entire text of the IAD, including all articles
and subsections, is codified at section 77-29-5, the statute will
be cited herein as "IAD, Art.
(_)." A copy of the statute is
attached in Addendum A..
3

because of defendant's plea of not guilty (R.
244, 304).
Nov. 6, 1989

Defendant is transferred to Illinois custody,
and is placed in the Mercer County Jail on
Nov. 11 (R. 246). The State files its motion
to dismiss case no. 891000111 FS, explaining
in detail the reasons for the motion (R. 243
-46, 294-304). The district court orders
dismissal without prejudice (R. 246, 306-07,
596-97).

Dec. 21, 1989

After further investigation, Utah files a new
information in the circuit court in Cache
County (case no. 891001462), charging
defendant with fifteen counts of
communication fraud and theft by deception
(R. 1-8, 246-47, 340, 597) .

Feb. 7, 1990

Defendant files with the Mercer County
Sheriff a written request for final
disposition "of all charges pending in Utah"
(R. 247, 308, 597). Addendum B. He is told
by both Illinois and Utah authorities that
the letter is premature and ineffective (R.
247-48, 309-11, 598; Tr. 4-5). The Utah
prosecutor receives the letter on March 12
(R. 247).

Mar. 26, 1990

Because of defendant's correspondence, the
Utah district court holds a sua sponte
hearing in the dismissed case (case no.
891000111 FS), without notice, because of
defendant's correspondence and satisfies
itself that the Illinois charges must be
determined before Utah can act (R. 24 8, 314,
340-41, 498; Transcript of Mar. 26, 1990,
hearing at 1 ) .

Apr. 3, 1990

Utah notifies Illinois of its felony warrant
(R. 586).

June 5, 1990

Defendant seeks counsel in the Utah circuit
court case (case no. 891001462) (R. 248, 315,
523, 599).

July 25, 1990

Defendant is sentenced on the Illinois
charges and receives credit for time served
(R. 249, 321-23, 599). He is transferred to
federal custody on July 31, 1990, pursuant to
a federal felony warrant (R. 246, 249).
4

Aug. 2, 1990

Utah notifies federal authorities of its
felony warrant (R. 399524) .

Aug. 9, 1990

Defendant posts bail and is released from
federal custody (R. 249, 401; Tr. 23-24). He
returns to federal custody on Jan. 31, 1991
(R. 249).

Mar. 15, 1991

Defendant files a motion to dismiss and seeks
counsel in the Utah case previously dismissed
on Nov. 6, 1989 (R% 249, 316-20, 341, 531,
600). Addendum H. He renews his request for
counsel on July 3, 1991 (R. 165).

May 7, 1991

Defendant files a federal habeas corpus
petition against the Utah authorities, none
of whom receive service or appeared (R. 254
-55, 274, 356-57, 366-67, 601; Tr. 23). The
petition is denied on September 24, 1991 (R.
255, 350-53)

May 13, 1991

Defendant is sentenced in federal court on
five counts of mail fraud (R. 249, 325-27) .

June 4, 1991

Defendant is permanently incarcerated in the
Sandstone Federal Correctional Institution in
Sandstone, Minnesota (Sandstone) (R. 249,
325-27) . Sandstone notifies Utah of
defendant's presence on March 4, 1992 (R.
328, 436) .

June 26, 1991

Utah lodges an official detainer with the
authorities at Sandstone (R. 250, 329, 602).
However, defendant resists extradition (R.
602) .

June 27, 1991

Utah sends a formal request to Sandstone for
temporary custody of defendant pursuant to
Article IV of the IAD (R. 250, 330-31).

July 7, 1991

Defendant notifies Utah authorities of his
resistance to extradition (R. 250, 332).

July 25, 1991

Defendant invokes the 30-day hold under
Article IV(a), during which time he cannot be
extradited (R. 250, 333-34, 602; Plaintiff's
Exh. #1, last page). The period expires on
Aug. 24, 1991 (R. 334, 602).

July 31, 1991

Defendant notifies federal authorities that
he intends to resist extradition to Utah (Tr.
19-20; Plaintiff's Exh. #4). He repeats a
5

similar notice on Aug. 26, 1991 (Tr. 17
-18; Plaintiff's Exh. #1, page 4 ) , and
refuses to sign the IAD forms (Tr. 18;
Plaintiff's Exh. #1, page 5 ) .
Aug. 26, 1991

Sandstone offers Utah temporary custody of
defendant under the IAD (R. 250, 335-36).

Sept. 20, 1991

Sandstone notifies defendant of his right to
file a request for disposition under the IAD
and offers to complete the necessary
paperwork (R. 251, 337).

Sept. 26, 1991

Defendant notifies federal authorities that
he still opposes extradition to Utah (R.
251, 338) .

Oct. 4, 1991

Defendant appeals the denial of his habeas
petition to the Tenth Circuit (R. 255, 35763). On Nov. 13, he moves to withdraw his
appeal (R. 255, 364), and the Tenth Circuit
dismisses the appeal on Dec. 4, 1991, with no
appearance made by Utah authorities (R. 255,
365) .

Dec. 16, 1991

Utah authorities advise Sandstone that they
will proceed with extradition (R. 251, 339
-41), and ultimately arrange for his transfer
to Utah custody on February 19, 1992 (R. 251
-52, 342-44) .

Feb. 19, 1992

Defendant arrives in Utah (R. 252, 603).
Counsel is appointed for him the following
day (id.).

Feb. 24, 1992

Defendant files a motion to dismiss in the
circuit court (R. 214-34, 252, 604). The
State responds with a motion to quash (R.
252-53, 345-46, 604), and the circuit court
grants the State's motion on Apr. 2, 1992 (R.
253, 345-46, 604).

Apr. 30, 1992

After defendant is bound over to the
district court on April 27 (R. 253, 237), the
State files a motion in the district court
for immediate arraignment and trial setting
(R. 209-10, 253, 348-49) .

May 1, 1992

Defendant files a motion to dismiss in the
district court (R. 211-34). The State
responds on May 18 (R. 238-367) .
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May 15, 1992

Following defendant's express waiver of his
speedy trial time at the arraignment on May
11 (R. 236, 605; Addendum C ) , the district
court schedules the four-day jury trial to
begin July 7, 1992 (R. 370). 3

June 5, 1992

Defendant files a motion requesting discovery
(R. 372-73) and a motion for an extension of
time to reply to the State's response to
his motion to dismiss (R. 374-75). The State
responds to the discovery motion on Aug. 11
(R. 384-407). His extension is granted by
order entered Aug. 24 (R. 451-52), and his
response is filed Sept. 21 (R. 483-546).

June 8, 1992

The district court vacates the trial setting
after defendant requests a continuance of
trial and expressly waives his speedy trial
rights in open court (R. 3 76-77) . Addendum C.

June 11, 1992

Defendant files a motion for appointment of
counsel and a motion requesting discovery (R.
409-24) . He also files a new federal habeas
action.

Aug. 2_, 19924

Defendant files a "Motion for
I Declaration of Invalidity" and a motion to
withhold determination of his motion to
dismiss pending a decision on this new motion
(R. 427-448). The State responds on Sept. 8
(R. 464-82) .

Oct. 5, 1992

Following an evidentiary hearing on Sept. 24
(R. 551-56), the court enters a memorandum
decision denying both motions (R. 568-73).

Oct. 13, 1992

A pre-trial conference is held in which
defendant expressly waives his speedy trial
time for the third time (R. 579-80).
Addendum C. Two days later, the court
schedules the trial to begin October 26, 1992
(R. 576).

Oct. 19 & 20, 1992

A hearing is held in district court based on
defendant's concerns about the October 26
trial setting (R. 581-82). Defendant informs

3

This puts the trial setting beyond the 120-day period
defendant asserts in his appellate brief. Br. of App. at 26.
4

The exact date on the record entry is illegible.
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the court that he will file an interlocutory
appeal and that his motions and the appeal
should be addressed before trial; defendant
opines that a setting on November 18 would
fall within the 120-day period of Article IV
(R. 581-83). Addendum D.
Oct. 21, 1992

The district court reschedules the trial to
begin on November 18, 1992 (R. 584).

Oct. 26, 1992

Defendant files an interlocutory appeal with
the Utah Supreme Court (R. 669).

Oct. 29, 1992

The district court enters written findings
and conclusions denying defendant's motion to
dismiss and motion for declaration of
invalidity (R. 591-611). Defendant objects
to the findings and conclusions on Nov. 4 (R.
612-14), and the court rules on the
objections on November 5 (R. 673-77) .
Amended findings and conclusions are entered
on Nov. 9 (R. 685-704).

Oct. 29, 1992

Defendant files two motions to suppress
evidence (R. 615-58).

Nov. 3, 1992

Defendant files a motion to sever the
charges, which he amends two days later (R.
659-65). The State responds to defendant's
three motions on November 10 (R. 707-22) .

Nov. 5, 1992

Defendant moves to stay the proceedings
because he does not want to go to trial until
the Utah Supreme Court has ruled on his
issues (R. 669-70). The district court
denies the motion on November 6 (R. 678).

Nov. 9, 1992

Based on defendant's motion to continue the
trial (a copy of which does not appear in the
record), the judge, in open court,
reschedules the three-day trial to start
January 13, 1993 (R. 681-82) . A formal order
is entered on November 23, reflecting
defendant's waiver of his speedy trial rights
(R. 734-37). Addendum C.

Nov. 18, 1992

The court denies defendant's three motions
following an evidentiary hearing (R. 730-32).
Formal findings and conclusions are entered
Nov. 24 (R. 738-45). The State files an
amended information (R. 724-29, 732).
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Nov. 20, 1992

The Utah Supreme Court denies defendant's
interlocutory appeal (R. 733). A second
order denying the appeal is entered Jan. 12,
1993 (R. 803). 5

Nov. 30, 1992

Defendant files a pro se motion for new
counsel (R. 746-52), to which the State
responds on Dec. 9 (R. 753-76). Defendant
replies on Dec. 14 (R. 777-84), and the court
enters its memorandum decision denying the
motion on Dec. 15 (R. 785-87). The formal
findings and conclusions are entered Dec. 16
(R. 797-800).

Dec. 16, 1992

Defendant files a motion to reconsider the
Dec. 15 decision on his motion for new
counsel (R. 788-93). Although the State
responds within three days (R. 795-96), the
file reflects no final order from the court.

Jan. 12, 1993

Following a Jan. 5 hearing on defendant's
motion for appointment of co-counsel (a copy
of which does not appear in the record), the
district court appoints co-counsel (R. 801
-02) .

Jan. 13, 1993

The jury is selected, and the jurors are
sworn (R. 804-08) .

Jan. 14, 1993

A plea agreement is presented to and accepted
by the court, and the jury is dismissed (R.
811). Addendum E. The agreement is signed
(R. 847-63), and a second amended
information is filed pursuant to the
agreement (R. 843-46) .

Jan. 20, 1993

Judgment and sentence is entered by the
district court (R. 863-66) .

Feb. 5, 1993

Defendant files a motion seeking credit for
time served (R. 868071), and is released to
federal authorities (unnumbered sheet between
R. 875 and 876).

5

In a telephone conversation with the Utah Supreme Court
clerk, the State has learned that both orders denying defendant's
interlocutory appeal stem from the same appeal. The first order
was issued after defendant filed his initial petition. Defendant
later filed a supplement to his petition, after which the supreme
court issued a second order in the same case denying the appeal.
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Feb. 8, 1993

Defendant files a motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas and renews his motion to dismiss
the charges (R. 872-75). Addendum F. The
State responds on Feb. 10 (R. 877-79), and
the district court enters its findings and
conclusions denying the motion on Feb. 11 (R.
880-83). Thereafter, defendant files an
affidavit reply (R. 884-86), and the court,
after reconsidering the motion, denies it on
April 29 (unnumbered findings and conclusions
filed after R. 900). Addendum G.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

By information dated December 21, 1989, Defendant Jack
D. Brocksmith was charged with eleven counts of theft by
deception--one first degree felony, nine second degree felonies,
and one third degree felony--in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-405 (1990), and four counts of communications fraud--one first
degree felony and three second degree felonies--in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1990) (R. 1-8). Generally, the
charges arose from several incidents in which defendant, while
purporting to represent different insurance companies, obtained
money from several people and knowingly failed to tell them that
the money would be used for purposes other than purchasing life
insurance policies (R. 12-24, 849-54).

These incidents occurred

between March 1988 and June 1989 (R. 1-8).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant seeks a remand of this matter to the district
court for withdrawal of his guilty pleas and dismissal of the
Utah charges with prejudice.

He bases his right to relief on:

1) the State's alleged violation of his statutory speedy trial
rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act; 2) the
10

State's alleged violation of his constitutional speedy trial
rights under both the federal and the state constitutions; and 3)
the State's alleged violation of several procedural laws as well
as the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
However, there are several reasons why this Court should not
reach the merits of any of defendant's allegations.
Despite defendant's bald assertion that he challenges
the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas, Br. of App. at ii, 2, 12, 27, 32, his brief does not
contain any citation to the standard of review or legal authority
relevant to appellate review of the trial court's ruling.
Neither does defendant challenge the entry of his plea.

Instead,

the arguments in his brief involve alleged pre-plea violations,
none of which were asserted below as a basis for withdrawing the
plea.
Two of the alleged statutory speedy trial violations in
defendant's first argument were never raised below.

The

remaining allegation of a statutory violation was reviewed and
denied by the trial court prior to entry of the guilty plea and
was waived by:

1) defendant's four express waivers given in open

court; 2) defendant's plea agreement and unconditional guilty
pleas; and 3) defendant's resistance of extradition and
subsequent dilatory tactics.

Defendant waived his constitutional

speedy trial argument by entering his guilty pleas and by failing
to raise the claims in support of his motion to withdraw his
pleas.

Finally, defendant waived the due process and equal
11

protection violations he asserts in his third argument by
entering his guilty pleas, and he raises them for the first time
on appeal without an assertion of plain error or exceptional
circumstances.

Accordingly, this Court need not address the

merits of defendant's arguments on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ADDRESS THE MERITS OF THE IAD
ISSUES RAISED BY DEFENDANT BECAUSE HE HAS AFFIRMATIVELY
WAIVED THEM
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas based on the
State's alleged pre-plea violation of his statutory speedy trial
rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD),
specifically, the State's failure to:

1) commence trial within

the 180-day period provided by Article III; 2) commence trial
within the 120-day period provided by Article IV; and 3) timely
transport defendant to Utah under Articles IV and V.6
6

Br. of

This Court may refuse to reach the merits of all of
defendant's appellate arguments because defendant's brief violates
rule 24(a)(5), (7), (8), (9), and 24(e), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, by:
1) providing no relevant legal authority or
argument for his repeated assertion that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas; 2) providing no
standard of review for any of his arguments; 3) labeling his
conclusion as a summary of arguments and omitting a true summary;
and 4) providing insufficient record citations throughout his
brief--one citation in his first argument, none in his second, one
in his third, and only a handful in his ten-page statement of the
case--despite the fact that the issues he raises are factintensive, the court's record consists of over 900 pages spanning
5 volumes (exclusive of three envelopes) and has no index, and
numerous relevant documents were filed in a case which is not
included in the current record, making those documents available,
if at all, only as attachments to various memoranda scattered
12

App. at 12-27.

Defendant's argument, in light of the facts of

this case, requires this Court to initially determine whether the
statutory speedy trial rights under the IAD are waivable.

If

they can be waived, defendant has waived them by his own actions.
If they cannot be waived, this Court must address the merits of
defendant's claim that the State's alleged violations entitle him
to dismissal of his charges.
A.

A Prisoner May Waive His Rights Under The IAD
There is a split in the authorities which have

addressed this issue. A minority of courts have found that, in
limited circumstances, rights under the IAD may not be waived.
See, e.g., People v. Brooks, 189 Cal.App.3d 866, 234 Cal.Rptr.
573, 575 (4 Dist. 1987) ("As a general rule a guilty plea does
not constitute a waiver of a violation of the [IAD] properly
asserted before the plea is entered."); Gibson v. Klevenhagen,
777 F.2d 1056, 1058-59 (Tex. 1985) (relying on a separate state
statute relating to appeals from guilty pleas, the court held
that a guilty plea does not waive IAD violations which were
raised prior to entry of the plea).

However, a majority of the

courts addressing the issue have found to the contrary.

throughout the record. See State v. Yates. 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah
App. 1992) (declining to reach an inadequately-briefed argument);
State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 250 (Utah App. 1992) (finding
appellant's brief deficient, in part, because it failed to set
forth the appropriate standard of review with supporting authority
for each issue, and the purported issues did not correlate with the
body of the arguments); Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah
App. 1991) (finding a brief in violation of the rule, in part,
because it ignored the standard of review requirement).
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Speaking to various aspects of both Article III and
Article IV, a majority of jurisdictions has found that the IAD
generally affords prisoners a statutory protection, not a
fundamental or constitutional right.

Yellen v. Cooper. 828 F.2d

1471, 1474 (10th Cir. 1987); Greathouse v. United States. 655
F.2d 1032, 1034 (10th Cir. 1981), cert, denied 455 U.S. 926, 102
S. Ct. 1289 (1982); see also Webb v. Keohane, 804 F.2d 413, 41415 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Lawson, 736 F.2d 835, 838-39
(2nd Cir. 1984); United States v. Black, 609 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 847, 101 S. Ct. 132 (1980).
The protections afforded by the IAD are nonjurisdictional, State
v. Carter, 729 P.2d 336, 338 (Az. App. 1986); People v. Crossen,
485 N.Y.S.2d 189, 191 (N.Y. Sup. 1985), and may be waived by a
prisoner.

Yellen, 828 F.2d at 1474; Gray v. Benson, 608 F.2d

825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979) ; see also United States v. Oldaker, 823
F.2d 778, 781 (4th Cir. 1987) (Article IV is not jurisdictional
and can be waived per United States v. Odom, 674 F.2d 228, 23 0
(4th Cir), cert, denied, 457 U.S. 1125 (1982)); Kowalak v. United
States, 645 F.2d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Palmer, 574 F.2d 164, 167 (3d Cir.) (Article IV(e)), cert,
denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978); United States v. Tummolo, 822
F.Supp. 1561, 1564 n.5 (S.D. Fla. 1993); People v. Nitz, 219
Cal.App.3d 164, 268 Cal.Rptr. 54, 57 (1990).

The waiver need not

be "knowing and intelligent," but must be voluntary.

Gray, 608

F.2d at 826-27; see also Lawson, 736 F.2d at 838-39; Odom, 674
F.2d at 230; People v. Brown, 854 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Colo. App.
14

1992); People v. Jones, 495 N.W.2d 159, 160 (Mich. App. 1992),
appeal denied, 503 N.W.2d 902 (1993).

The general rationale is

that the rights arising under the IAD are not of such fundamental
importance as to preclude their voluntary waiver.

See Kowalak,

645 F.2d at 537; Palmer, 574 F.2d at 167; Carter, 729 P.2d at
338.
Waiver occurs through an inmate's own actions, Amicrer
v. Long, 474 N.Y.S.2d 852, 854 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept. 1984); People v.
Torres, 456 N.E.2d 497, 499-500 (N.Y. 1983), and generally
accompanies a prisoner's request for or acquiescence in treatment
in a manner contrary to IAD protections.

Yellen, 828 F.2d at

1474 (signing a transfer request signals a waiver of IAD rights);
Gray, 608 F.2d at 827 (requesting a transfer away from the
charging jurisdiction before trial essentially seeks treatment
contrary to the IAD); see also Keohane, 804 F.2d at 414
(requesting a transfer from the charging jurisdiction waives IAD
rights); Kowalak, 645 F.2d at 537 (pleading guilty and standing
trial both seek treatment contrary to the IAD).
B. Defendant Waived His Statutory Speedy Trial Rights Under The
IAD
1. Defendant Expressly Waived His Rights In Open Court
On Four Occasions
After being extradited to Utah, defendant expressly
waived his statutory speedy trial rights under the IAD four times
in open court while represented by counsel.

Defendant's first

waiver occurred during his arraignment in district court on May
11, 1992. After the State requested a trial setting, defendant
15

waived his time for a speedy trial (R. 235-36; Addendum C), and
the trial court scheduled the trial to begin on July 7 (R. 370)-beyond both the 180- and the 120-day limits defendant claims in
his brief.7

Br. of App. at 21, 26.

Defendant's second waiver occurred on June 8, 1992.
Defendant sought from the court an extension of time to
supplement his motion to dismiss and expressly waived his speedy
trial time (R. 376-77) . Addendum C.

As a result, the district

court vacated the trial setting and scheduled another motion
hearing (R. 377).
Defendant announced his third express waiver at the
pre-trial conference on October 13, 1992. Defendant informed the
court that he intended to file an interlocutory appeal and
additional motions, then expressly waived his speedy trial time
(R. 579-80) . Addendum C.

The court then rescheduled the trial

from October to November (R. 584).
Finally, defendant moved to continue the November trial
setting and, at a review hearing on November 9, 1992, "knowingly
and voluntarily in open court . . . waived his right to a speedy
trial and to the commencement of trial" within the time allowed
under the IAD (R. 681-82, 734-37).

Addendum C.

The final waiver

was reduced to a written order signed by the trial judge (R. 734-

7

Defendant has not challenged the voluntary nature of any of
his express waivers, and this Court should presume that the waivers
encompassed both his constitutional and his statutory speedy trial
rights where there is nothing in the record to the contrary. State
v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 788 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d
327 (Utah 1991) .
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37).

Addendum C.

The district court granted defendant's motion

and rescheduled the trial to begin on January 13, 1993 (R. 705).
Addendum C.
The record clearly reflects that the district court
scheduled trial dates only after receiving express waivers from
defendant of his speedy trial time.

Granting defendant relief on

appeal based on the delay in trying the charges would sanction
invited error as he led the court to rely on his waivers in
setting and repeatedly continuing the trial setting.

See State

v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992) (noting that to
allow a claim of plain error where counsel failed to raise his
juror challenge below would sanction invited error); State v.
Smith, 776 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah App. 1989) (a defendant cannot
lead the court into error then later profit by his actions).

The

multiple express waivers, relied upon by the prosecutor and the
trial court, should bind defendant, see People v. Jones, 4 95
N.W.2d 159, 161 (Mich. App. 1992) (a defendant's request for or
express agreement with a trial setting outside the IAD timeframe
waives his IAD rights), appeal denied, 503 N.W.2d 902 (1993);
People v. Nitz, 219 Cal.App.3d 164, 268 Cal.Rptr. 54, 57 (1990)
(express waivers are deemed effective even if the IAD speedy
trial period has run prior to the time the waiver is given), and
this Court should refuse to review the merits of his IAD claims
on appeal.

See, e.g., State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Utah

App. 1993) .
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2. Defendant Voluntarily Waived His Rights By Entering
Unconditional Guilty Pleas
Entry of a valid guilty plea waives the right to assert
violations of the IAD.

See Baxter v. United States, 966 F.2d

387, 389 (8th Cir. 1992); Beachem v. Attorney General of
Missouri, 808 F.2d 1303, 1304 (8th Cir. 1987); Kowalak v. United
States, 645 F.2d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 1981); State v. Carter, 729
P.2d 336, 338 (Az. App. 1986); Sherman v. State, 693 P.2d 1071,
1072 (Id. App. 1984); State v. Ternaku, 383 A.2d 437, 439 (N.J.
App. 1978); People v. Cusick, 489 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (N.Y.A.D. 2
Dept. 1985); Knox v. State, 848 P.2d 1354, 1358 (Wyo. 1993) (only
by conditioning his guilty plea on his right to appeal IAD and
speedy trial issues did defendant preserve these issues for
appellate review); see generally State v. Smith, 833 P.2d 371,
372 (Utah App. 1992) (a voluntary plea of guilty waives the right
to appeal all nonjurisdictional issues); State ex rel. E.G.T.,
808 P.2d 138, 139 (Utah App. 1991).

This is so even if the time

provisions of the IAD had been violated prior to the entry of the
plea.

Nitz, 268 Cal.Rptr. at 57.
All of the guilty pleas entered on January 14, 1993,

are unconditional, and defendant does not challenge their
validity on appeal.

Defendant executed a plea agreement which

expressed his intent to waive the IAD claims by entering his
unconditional pleas.

The agreement provides that the pleas waive

"any issue for appeal relative to the Court's rulings on pretrial motions or based upon statutory or constitutional
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challenges" (R. 856) .8 Addendum E.

Hence, defendant's guilty

pleas waived the IAD claims he seeks to raise on appeal.9
3. Defendant Waived His Claim of IAD Violations By
Resisting Extradition And Engaging In Dilatory Tactics
Defendant's active resistance to the efforts of Utah
authorities to extradite him and his delaying tactics thereafter
waive any right to assert IAD violations.

See United States v.

Oldaker, 823 F.2d 778, 780-81 (4th Cir. 1987) (unexpected and
8

The plea agreement states, in relevant part:

j.
I understand that by pleading guilty I am
waiving my statutory and constitutional rights to file an
appeal.
k. I know that by entering pleas of guilty, I am
admitting and do so admit, that I have committed the
conduct alleged and that I am guilty of the crimes for
which my pleas are entered. I further understand that I
am pleading guilty unconditionally and that I am not
preserving any issue for appeal relative to the Court's
rulings on pre-trial motions or based upon statutory or
constitutional challenges in this case.
(R. 856). Addendum E.
9

Further, this Court should not review the trial court's
ruling on defendant's motion to withdraw the pleas because
defendant does not present any relevant legal authority or argument
supporting his claim that the trial court's ruling constituted
error, Br. of App. at 12, 27, and defendant did not present the
alleged IAD violations to the trial court as a basis to withdraw
his pleas. His pro se motion to withdraw his guilty pleas was
based solely on his claim that the State failed to expeditiously
return him to federal custody after sentencing on the Utah charges,
in violation of the plea agreement and Article IV(e) and (h) of the
IAD; he does not raise this argument on appeal (R. 873-74) .
Addendum F. Although the motion resurrected defendant's motion to
dismiss, it did not urge the pre-plea claims as a basis for
withdrawing his pleas, nor did the trial court interpret them in
that manner (unnumbered order filed Apr. 29, 1993). Addendum F
and G. Accordingly, this Court need not address the trial court's
ruling on defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas. State v.
Hodson, 866 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah App. 1993); Brown, 856 P.2d at 35960; State v. Brooks, 225 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 19 (Utah App. 1993).
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unjustified withdrawal of plea contrary to plea agreement invited
delay and precluded relief); United States v. Boggs, 612 F.2d
991, 993 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 857, 101 S. Ct. 156
(1980) (a prisoner "cannot by his own action manufacture a
violation of the (IAD) and then seek relief under it.");
Commonwealth v. Fasano. 375 N.E.2d 361, 366 (Mass. App. 1978)
(defendant's untimely filing of a defense motion waived part of
the IAD time period).

Cf. People v. Cranmer, 389 N.Y.S.2d 905,

906 (App. Div. 3 Dept. 1976) (defendant's own conduct in having
trial postponed because he intended to plead guilty, then
changing his mind about his plea, was the cause of his failure to
be timely tried and constituted a waiver of his rights under the
IAD) .
A prisoner's Article III request constitutes a waiver
of extradition to the charging state.

IAD, Art. 111(e).

The

record shows that defendant continually resisted extradition to
Utah following his incarceration in the Sandstone facility on
June 4, 1991, despite his assertion on appeal that the 180-day
period under Article III began on June 4 (R. 250, 332-34, 338,
357-63; Tr. 17-20).

Br. of App. at 17. Those efforts constitute

an affirmative decision by defendant to be treated in a manner
contrary to the protections of Article III. Accordingly, his
actions waived his Article III protections.

See Yellen v.

Cooper, 828 F.2d 1471, 1474 (10th Cir. 1987); Gray v. Benson. 608
F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979).
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Moreover, after inhibiting his return to Utah,
defendant was responsible for delaying his trial as well.

From

the time he arrived in Utah until the time he entered his pleas,
defendant filed no less than 17 motions, objections, replies and
extension requests, plus an interlocutory appeal and a federal
habeas action, most of which involve identical IAD issues. The
trial was originally set then rescheduled four times all based on
defendant's express waivers of his speedy trial rights in open
court (Addendum C), and on his written acknowledgement that the
120-day period of Article IV would not be violated.

Addendum C.

Defendant took the position before the court that rulings on his
motions and miscellaneous filings were required before trial
could occur (R. 427-48, 581-82, 669-70, 735-37).

Defendant's

actions clearly accounted for the delay in his trial and
demonstrate, without question, that defendant had abandoned any
interest in receiving a speedy disposition of the Utah charges in
accordance with the purpose of the IAD.

See Point 11(A), infra.

On the other hand, the State made every attempt to
expedite trial on the Utah charges by maintaining contact with
Illinois and federal authorities to ascertain defendant's
availability under the IAD (R. 297-98, 310-11, 333-34, 339-43,
344, 401-02), lodging a detainer and seeking defendant's
extradition to Utah under Article IV within two weeks of
defendant's incarceration in Sandstone (R. 329-31), obtaining his
presence in Utah as soon as practicable given defendant's
resistance, and formally seeking an immediate arraignment and
21

trial setting once defendant was bound over to district court (R.
209-10).

Given the State's good-faith efforts to expedite the

trial, defendant's numerous, repetitive filings and affirmative
efforts to resist extradition--all of which had the foreseeable
effect of delaying Utah's ability to try him in 180 days--waive
his right to assert IAD violations.

See Oldaker, 823 F.2d at

780-81.
4. Additionally, Defendant Waived His Claims Under
Articles IV And V By Failing To Raise Them Below
The provisions of Articles IV and V were additionally
waived by defendant's failure to raise either issue below.
Defendant never presented to the trial court any allegation
either that the State violated the 120-day period of Article IV
or that the State violated Article V by failing to timely
transport him to Utah after August 26, 1991. Because defendant
raises these issues for the first time on appeal and presents no
claim of plain error or exceptional circumstances, this Court
should not address the merits of either claim.

State v.

Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 705 n.2 (Utah App. 1993); State v.
Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 (Utah App. 1992).
POINT II
SHOULD THIS COURT REACH THE MERITS OF DEFENDANT'S IAD
CLAIMS, IT WILL FIND NO IAD VIOLATION BECAUSE DEFENDANT
NEVER ACTIVATED ARTICLE III, TRIAL BEGAN WITHIN THE
PERIODS REQUIRED BY ARTICLES III AND IV, AND DISMISSAL
IS NOT WARRANTED FOR A DELAY IN EXTRADITING DEFENDANT
UNDER ARTICLE IV WHERE DEFENDANT RESISTED EXTRADITION
Because of the lack of Utah authority directly on
point, the split in authority concerning waiver of IAD
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protections, and the fact that the various jurisdictions
interpreting the IAD do not do so uniformly, the State addresses
in this Point the merits of defendant's arguments found at Point
I (A)-(C) in Appellant's Brief.10

However, the State does not

concede that this Court should reach the merits of defendant's
IAD claims.
A.

Introduction:

Overview of Relevant IAD Provisions

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act is an
interstate compact governed by federal law under Article 1,
Section 10, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution.
v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438-42 (1981).

Cuyler

Utah's version is

identical to that adopted by the District of Columbia, the United
States, and forty-seven other states.
P.2d 943, 945 (Utah 1993).

Crosland v. State, 857

The IAD's purpose is to "'encourage

the expeditious and orderly disposition of . .. charges
[outstanding against a prisoner] and determination of the proper
status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments,
informations, or complaints.'"

Crosland, 857 P.2d at 945

(quoting United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 343 (1978) and
Article I of the IAD). The statute protects not only the rights
of prisoners to a speedy trial, but also the interests of the
party states.

Crosland, 857 P.2d at 945; State v. Stilling, 770

P.2d 137, 140 (Utah 1989).

10

For a discussion of the non-uniform results reached by the
various jurisdictions under the IAD, see Zupanec, D. M., Validity,
Construction, and Application of Interstate Agreement on Detainers,
98 A.L.R.3d 160 (1980).
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Once a signatory state [charging state] files a
detainer against a person incarcerated in another signatory state
[custodial state], the protections of the Act may be activated by
either the prisoner or the charging state.

IAD, Art. Ill(a) and

IV(a); Addendum A; Crosland, 857 P.2d at 945; Stilling, 770 P.2d
at 140.

When the custodial officials notify the prisoner of the

detainer, the prisoner may invoke the protections of Article III
by submitting to the custodial authorities a written request for
disposition of the charges underlying the detainer.
Ill (a) and (c); Crosland, 857 P.2d at 945."

IAD, Art.

By making the

request, a prisoner waives extradition to the charging state for
the purpose of trial on the outstanding charges and waives
extradition back to the charging state to serve any term of
imprisonment imposed there after his term in the custodial state
expires.

IAD, Art. 111(e).

Upon receipt of a proper request,

the custodial official must forward the request to the
"appropriate court" and the prosecuting attorney in the charging
state together with an offer to provide temporary custody of the
prisoner and with certain other specific information identified
in the statute.
945.

IAD, Art. Ill(a) and (d); Crosland, 857 P.2d at

The charging state authorities must then bring the prisoner

11

Some states allow a prisoner to bypass the custodial
authorities but may hold him to a higher standard of compliance
with the IAD. See, e.g., McCallum v. State, 407 So.2d 865, 869
(Ala. Crim. App. 1981); Commonwealth v. Martens, 500 N.E.2d 282,
286 n.2 (Mass. 1986), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1041, 107 S. Ct. 1982
(1987); State v. Tarango, 734 P.2d 1275, 1279 (N.M. App. 1987),
overruled on other grounds by Zurla v. State, 789 P.2d 588 (N.M.
1990) (and cases cited therein).
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to trial on the charges within 180 days of their receipt of valid
written notice.

IAD, Art. Ill(a); Crosland, 857 P.2d at 945-46;

see also Fex v. Michigan,

U.S.

, 113 S. Ct. 1085, 1091

(1993) .
If the charging state authorities wish to activate the
provisions of the IAD after filing a detainer, they may request
temporary custody of the prisoner from the custodial state.

IAD,

Art. IV(a); Stilling, 770 P.2d at 140. The states must exchange
certain information, and either the prisoner or the governor of
the custodial state may request 3 0 days in which the governor may
review the request for temporary custody.
Art. V.

IAD, Art. IV(a) and

Should the prisoner be extradited to the charging state,

trial must be had within 120 days of his arrival in the state.
IAD, Art. IV(c).
The time periods specified in the IAD may be tolled or
continued under certain circumstances.

IAD, Art. Ill (a), Art.

IV(c), Art. VI; see subsection (B)(2), infra.
B. The State Did Not Violate The Speedy Trial Provisions Of
Article III of the IAD
1.

Defendant Never Invoked His Article III Protections
Article III outlines several procedural factors which

must be met before the protections of the article are activated.
Specifically, it provides:
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of
imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of
a party state, and whenever during the continuance of
the term of imprisonment there is pending in anv other
party state any untried indictment, information or
complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been
lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to
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trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to be
delivered to the prosecuting officer and the
appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's
jurisdiction written notice of the place of his
imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to
be made of the indictment, information or complaint;
provided that for good cause shown in open court, the
prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having
jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or
reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner
shall be accompanied by a certificate of the
appropriate official having custody of the prisoner,
stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner
is being held, the time already served, the time
remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of
good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the
prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency
relating to the prisoner.
(Emphasis added.)

Addendum A.

Defendant contends that when he

filed his written request for disposition under Article III on
February 7, 1990, there were untried charges outstanding against
him in Utah and the Utah authorities had filed a detainer with
Sandstone (a copy of the request is attached in Addendum B).
of App. at 16-17.

Br.

He argues that once he was incarcerated at the

Sandstone facility on June 4, 1991, he had complied with the last
of the procedural requirements of Article III, albeit not in the
order stated in the statute, and was entitled to be tried on the
Utah charges within 180 days of that date.12 Id. at 15-22.
12

He

Defendant briefly references the fact that he "has
previously argued" that Article III was triggered before his
incarceration at Sandstone in June 1991. Br. of App. at 21.
However, his brief reference to previous arguments is devoid of
record or legal authority or citation, is both cursory and
speculative, and is entirely insufficient to put the previous
arguments before this Court for appellate review. Moreover, he
expressly "put [s] those arguments aside" and concedes that the only
trigger to the Article III protections which he asserts on appeal
is the June 1991 date of his incarceration at the Sandstone
facility.
Id. at 17, 21-22. Accordingly, the State does not
address the "previous" arguments in this brief.
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argues that the State's failure to bring him to trial before
December 3, 1991, regardless of the order in which the Article
III prerequisites were accomplished, constitutes a violation of
Article III and entitles him to withdrawal of his guilty pleas
and dismissal of the Utah charges.

Id.

However, defendant's

argument necessarily fails because he never activated the
protections of Article III.
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the order in which
the procedural prerequisites of Article III are accomplished is
important to the application of the IAD's protections.

A

prisoner cannot take steps to invoke his IAD rights until a
detainer has been lodged with the custodial state.

IAD, Art.

Ill(a); Crosland v. State, 857 P.2d 943, 945 (Utah 1993); State
v. Martin, 765 P.2d 854, 856 (Utah 1988); s^e also United States
v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 343-34 (1978); State v. Ferdinando, 260
S.E.2d 423, 426 (N.C. 1979).

Further, it is not a prisoner's

incarceration which triggers the 180-day period under Article
III, but rather the charging state's receipt of the prisoner's
written notice.

Fex v. Michigan,

U.S.

, 113 S. Ct. 1085,

1090-91 (1993) (the receiving state's prosecutors should not bear
the "risk of losing their case until they have been informed of
the request for trial." (emphasis in original)); Crosland, 857
P.2d at 946 ("180-day period could not have begun until Utah
authorities actually received [defendant's] request and received
notice that there was a valid request for trial"); State v.
Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 140 (Utah 1989); Martin, 765 P.2d at 856.
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This necessarily requires that all other prerequisites stated in
Article III are fulfilled prior to delivery of the written notice
to the receiving state:

time cannot commence against the

charging state if, when it receives defendant's written notice,
it has to wait for defendant to commence the required "term of
imprisonment."
In this case, the order in which defendant claims to
have fulfilled the Article III prerequisites did not activate his
IAD protections because at the time he filed his written request
for disposition on February 7, 1990, the IAD was not applicable
to him, rendering his request premature and ineffective.

A

prisoner's attempts to invoke the protections of the IAD are
ineffective unless the IAD is applicable to him.

See, e.g.,

Henaaer v. State, 716 P.2d 669, 672-73 (Okla. Cr. 1986) (a
written request filed before a detainer is lodged is of no effect
and does not become effective when a detainer is lodged
thereafter), overruled on other grounds by Cooper v. State, 810
P.2d 1303 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991); Crosland, 857 P.2d at 945-46
(a pre-detainer request was found to be "defective" and was given
no effect after a detainer was lodged).

The IAD does not apply

to pre-trial detainees or to prisoners released from custody.
United States v. Wilson, 719 F.2d 1491, 1494-95 (10th Cir. 1983)
(the IAD does not apply to a prisoner who is awaiting trial or
sentencing); see also United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 632-33
(7th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S. Ct. 1033
(1988); State v. Butler, 496 So.2d 916, 917-18 (Fla. App. 2 Dist.
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1986); Hickev v. State, 349 N.W.2d 772, 778 (Iowa App. 1984) (a
prisoner is a pre-trial detainee before his "term of
imprisonment" begins, and the IAD does not apply to him); State
v. Julian, 765 P.2d 1104, 1105-06 (Kan. 1988).

Moreover, release

from custody terminates the IAD's application.

See State v.

Bellino, 557 A.2d 963, 964 (Me. 1989) (the IAD does not apply to
a paroled prisoner); State v. Holley, 571 A.2d 892, 895-97 (Md.
App. 1990) (the IAD did not continue in effect after defendant's
term of imprisonment in another state ended); State v. Taranao,
734 P.2d 1275, 1278-79 (N.M. App. 1987) (once a prisoner was
released, his rights regarding speedy trial were the same as
those of any other individual), overruled on other grounds by
Zurla v. State, 789 P.2d 588 (N.M. 1990); State v. Thompson, 483
N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ohio App. 1984) (the IAD became
when defendant was released from imprisonment by the
state).

inapplicable
custodial

The reasoning has been clearly stated:

[T]he Agreement is only concerned that a sentenced
prisoner who has entered into the life of an
institution to which he has been committed for a term
of imprisonment not have programs of treatment and
rehabilitation obstructed by numerous absences in
connection with successive proceedings related to
pending charges in another jurisdiction. There is no
indication in the language of the Agreement or in the
legislative history that its provisions were intended
to apply to persons being detained for trial who are
not serving prison sentences . . . .
United States v. Roberts, 548 F.2d 665, 670-71 (6th Cir. 1977) .
Attempts to comply with Article III prerequisites before the IAD
is applicable are not later rendered effective merely because the
IAD eventually becomes applicable.
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See generally United States

v. Hall, 974 F.2d 1201, 1203-05 (9th Cir. 1992) (a request sent
before charges are outstanding does not trigger IAD protections
when it is sent or once charges are later filed); United States
v. Sanders, 669 F.2d 609, 610-11 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 456
U.S. 964, 102 S. Ct. 2044 (1982); United States v. Henson, 945
F.2d 430, 434-36 (1st Cir. 1991); People v. Garner, 224
Cal.App.3d 1363, 274 Cal.Rptr. 298, 301-02 (1990) (a detainer
lodged while defendant was a pre-trial detainee was ineffective
and did not follow defendant to prison after his conviction);
Commonwealth v. Llovd, 535 A.2d 1152, 1158-60 (Pa. Super.)
(written disposition requests sent before defendant began his
term of imprisonment did not trigger Article III time limits),
appeal denied. 542 A.2d 1367 (1988) . Accordingly, once the IAD
becomes applicable, a defendant is obligated to comply with all
the requirements of Article III in order to invoke its
protections.

See Martins, 765 P.2d at 857 (a prisoner must

comply with all the requirements of the IAD before he invokes the
protections of Article III); see also Newcomb v. State, 779 P.2d
1240, 1244 (Alaska App. 1989).
Defendant was a pre-trial detainee from the time he was
transferred from Utah to Illinois on November 6, 1989, until his
July 25, 1990, sentencing on the Illinois charges (R. 321-23);
his request for disposition was completed during this period.

At

sentencing, defendant was released, subject to holds from other
jurisdictions (id.).

He was then transferred to federal custody

and, on August 9, 1990, he posted bail and was released pending
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trial on the federal charges (R. 246, 249; Tr. 23-24).

When he

was later returned to federal custody on January 31, 1991,
defendant again assumed the position of a pre-trial detainee,
thus continuing his ineligibility for IAD protections until he
was sentenced on May 13, 1991, and incarcerated at the federal
facility on June 4, 1991 (R. 249-50, 325-27, 402).13
Consequently, the IAD did not apply to defendant at the time he
wrote his February 7, 1990, request for disposition, and
defendant was required to comply with all of the Article III
prerequisites after the IAD became applicable in 1991.
Utah charges were outstanding when defendant was
imprisoned at Sandstone.

Utah lodged a detainer with the

Sandstone authorities on June 26, 1991 (R. 250, 329), and
defendant was informed of the detainer on or before July 7, 1991
(R. 332) . At that point, the only prerequisite remaining under
Article III was a valid written request for disposition.
However, defendant failed to file any requests after his
premature and ineffective letter of February 7, 1990, despite
notice from both Sandstone and Utah authorities that the February
letter was premature, and despite notice from Sandstone
authorities that a request was required and that they would

13

Both the Utah and the Illinois authorities recognized that
the February 1990 request was premature (R. 247-48, 309-11, 598;
Tr. 4-5) . Once the IAD became applicable to defendant--after his
federal sentencing and incarceration--the Utah authorities lodged
a formal detainer against defendant, allowing him to invoke his IAD
protections (R. 250, 329).
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complete the necessary paperwork if he wished to proceed under
the IAD (R. 337; Tr. 18-19, 22). 1 4
Quoting from the United States Supreme Court's decision
of United States v. Mauro. 436 U.S. 340, 98 S. Ct. 1834 (1977),
defendant contends that his motion to dismiss, filed March 15,
1991, could constitute a valid request for final disposition of
the Utah charges (a copy of the motion is attached in Addendum
H).

Br. of App. at 14.

He contends that the motion put "the

Court and the State . . . on notice that the Defendant was
requesting speedy disposition of all Utah charges."

Id. at 15.

However, the motion cannot serve as de facto notice
under Article III that defendant was pursuing disposition of the
Utah charges for several reasons.

First, the motion was filed

while defendant was in federal custody awaiting sentencing on the
federal charges (R. 249, 325-27).

Accordingly, defendant was a

pre-trial detainee, and the IAD did not apply to him at the time
he filed the motion to dismiss.

Wilson, 719 F.2d at 1494-95.

Second, the motion was not filed in "the appropriate
court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction" as required by
Article III.

IAD, Art. Ill(a); Martin, 765 P.2d at 856

(communication solely to the prosecutor is insufficient
compliance with Article Ill's requirement of written notice to
both the prosecutor and the appropriate court).

Defendant filed

the motion in the First Judicial District Court in Cache County

14

Defendant's letter of July 7, 1991, expressly states, "this
is "NOT" a request for final disposition" (R. 332).
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in case number 891001140. Addendum H.

However, those charges

had been dismissed on November 6, 1989, with the knowledge and
acquiescence of defendant's attorney (R. 244, 304). At the time
defendant filed his motion to dismiss, the only Utah charges
against him were pending in the First Circuit Court in case
number 891001462 (R. 246-47, 306-07, 340, 596-97).

Defendant was

aware of the proper court and case number as he included both on
the letter he sent to the circuit court on June 5, 1990, seeking
appointment of counsel in the case (R. 523). Hence, the motion
did not constitute effective notice under Article III. Martin,
765 P.2d at 856.
Third, the motion did not put the Utah authorities on
notice that defendant intended to seek disposition of the Utah
charges.

A motion to dismiss is not a request for trial; it

indicates that defendant seeks dismissal of the charges, not
speedy disposition thereof.

See Commonwealth v. Martens, 500

N.E.2d 282, 286 (Mass. 1986) (such a motion indicates that
defendant is no longer willing to appear in the receiving state,
but seeks only to invoke the dismissal provisions of the IAD),
cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1041, 107 S. Ct. 1982 (1987); People v.
Beamon, 268 N.W.2d 310, 314 (Mich. App. 1978) (a motion for
speedy trial is not a sufficient request under Article III).
Defendant's motion did not include a copy of his earlier written
request for disposition, did not voice any intent that the
request was still operative, and did not suggest that he was
still seeking disposition of the Utah charges or would submit to
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extradition should his motion be denied.

Addendum H.

See

Crosland, 857 P.2d at 946-47 (finding a motion to dismiss
insufficient to comply with Article III requirements for similar
lapses); State v. Jensen, 818 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah 1991) (noting
that a motion to dismiss did not invoke Article III). To the
contrary, beginning with defendant's March 15, 1991, motion to
dismiss, his actions illustrated that he was no longer interested
in disposition of the Utah charges under the IAD, except by
dismissal.

See Crosland, 857 P.2d at 946-47.

In contrast,

Mauro, on which defendant relies, dealt with repeated requests
for a speedy trial which, by their terms, expressed a
corresponding willingness to resolve the charges which the
receiving authorities pointedly ignored.
65, 98 S. Ct. at 1849-50.

Mauro, 43 6 U.S. at 3 64-

Hence, Mauro does not support

defendant's position.
Henacrer v. State, 716 P.2d 669 (Okla. Cr. 1986), also
cited by defendant, should not be relied upon by this Court for
several reasons, not the least of which is the Oklahoma court's
fundamentally different interpretation of the IAD.

That court

finds that a prisoner has only one duty under the IAD--to ask his
custodial authorities to prepare and send the requisite forms.
Id.. 716 P.2d at 672-73.

In contrast, Utah has found that a

verbal request to the custodial authorities is wholly inadequate
to meet a prisoner's duty under the IAD.

Martin, 765 P.2d at

856-57 (a request to custodial authorities must be in writing
pursuant to the language of Article III) . Moreover, the Oklahoma
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court in Henager determined that defendant's motion to dismiss,
coupled with the Certificate of Inmate Status sent later,
constituted the requisite request under Article III, but did not
disclose the content of the motion or cite any authority for so
holding.

In contrast, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a

simple motion to dismiss, depending on content, does not
constitute the required notice under Article III.
P.2d at 946-47.

Crosland, 857

Finally, the Henager court makes no mention of

the "term of imprisonment" requirement or whether it may be met
after the disposition request.

Accordingly, Henager is not

persuasive authority in this matter.
Clearly, the Article III prerequisites could not be
fulfilled in the order defendant urges in this case.

Because

defendant's pre-trial detainee status rendered his February 7,
1990, request ineffective, his motion to dismiss does not qualify
as de facto notice under Article III, and he refused to submit
any written request subsequent to his federal sentencing and
incarceration, defendant has not complied with the requirements
of Article III and is not entitled to its protections.
Consequently, the Utah and Sandstone authorities appropriately
proceeded under Article IV.

See State v. Dolack, 533 P.2d 1282

(Kan. 1975) (no IAD violation occurred where, after defendant
sent a letter to the prosecutor, the prosecutor informed
defendant of how to do an appropriate Article III request, and
defendant refused to do so; the prosecutor then appropriately
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pursued custody of defendant through Article IV); see also
subsection (B)(3), infra.
2. Assuming Article III Was Activated, No IAD
Violation Occurred Where Trial Began Within The
Required 18 0 Days
The 180-day period within which trial must be had
pursuant to Article III may be tolled for various reasons,
including:

when defendant is "unable to stand trial", when the

proceedings are continued "for good cause", and when delays in
bringing defendant to trial are chargeable to defendant.15
Defendant concedes that delays attributable to him are excludable
from the 180-day computation under Article III. Br. of App. at
21.

However, he makes no attempt to identify the amount of delay

he caused.

After excluding the appropriate periods from the

computation in this case, and assuming, arguendo, that
defendant's incarceration on June 4, 1991, triggered the IAD, as
he contends, it becomes clear that there was no IAD violation as
defendant's trial commenced within 180 days.16
15

Article VI (a) provides:
(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates
of the time periods provided in Articles III and IV of
this agreement, the running of said time periods shall be
tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable
to stand trial, as determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the matter.
Article III(a) provides:
. . . provided that for good cause shown in open court,
the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court
having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary
or reasonable continuance.
16

By asserting this argument, the State does not concede that
defendant ever invoked his Article III protections. The point is
that, even if defendant's argument had merit, he is still not
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Delay which has been attributed to defendant and
excluded from an IAD computation includes:

1) delay caused by

various defense motions and dilatory tactics, United States v.
Dawn, 900 F.2d 1132, 1136-37 (7th Cir.) (involving Utah
prisoner), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 949, 111 S. Ct. 368 (1990);
United States v. Walker, 924 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1991); Hudson
v. Moran, 760 F.2d 1027, 1030-31 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 474
U.S. 981, 106 S. Ct. 387 (1985); United States v. Scheer, 729
F.2d 164, 168-69 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Moon v. State, 375
S.E.2d 442, 446-47 (Ga. 1988) (involving more than 60 pre-trial
motions to be resolved before trial could begin, and an agreement
by defendant to a trial setting outside the IAD period), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 982, 111 S. Ct. 1638 (1991); People v. Harlan,
344 N.W.2d 300, 301-02 (Mich. App. 1983); Knox v. State, 848 P.2d
1354, 1359 (Wyo. 1993) (involving motions to disqualify the trial
judge plus 11 other pre-trial motions); 2) continuances granted
at defendant's request or with his consent, Brown v. Wolff, 706
F.2d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 1983); Commonwealth v. Corbin, 519 N.E.2d
1367, 1369-70 (Mass. App. 1988); People v. Vrlaku, 504 N.Y.S.2d
612, 615-17 (N.Y. Sup. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 523
N.Y.S.2d 143 (1988); 3) delays caused by defendant's unreadiness
for trial, Harlan, 344 N.W.2d at 301-02; State v. Sallee. 624
S.W.2d 184, 186 (Mo. App. 1981); and 4) delays attributable to
defendant's struggle against extradition, People v. Uplinaer. 370
N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (111. 1977); Green v. State, 557 N.E.2d 1032,
entitled to the relief he seeks.
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1037-38 (Ind. App. 4 Dist. 1990) (defendant instructed the
custodial warden to resist the charging state's efforts to obtain
temporary custody); Commonwealth v. Stance, 428 A.2d 226, 227-28
(Pa. Super. 1981) (defendant was unavailable for trial during
time he refused extradition and remained in sending state).

See

generally State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 142 (Utah 1989)
(delays caused by defendant toll defendant's constitutional
speedy trial rights, including time related to defense motions
and substitutions of defense counsel).
In this case, defendant failed to exercise good faith
or diligent effort in proceeding under the IAD and he, in fact,
contributed to Utah's inability to dispose of its charges more
quickly.

The delays attributable to defendant are significant

and should be factored into the IAD calculation in order to avoid
rewarding him for his delaying tactics.

See State v. Velasguez,

641 P.2d 115, 116-17 (Utah 1982) (under intrastate rule, delay
attributable to defendant is not included in the statutory
computation because "[w]hen the prisoner himself acts to delay
trial . . . he indicates his willingness to temporarily waive
this protection; the purpose behind the statute thus no longer
exists, (citation omitted)").

Assuming, arguendo, that the 180-

day period began on June 4, 1991, as defendant contends,
defendant's efforts to resist extradition delayed Utah's ability
to comply with Article III and negate any assertion that
defendant was willing to cooperate in good faith in disposing of
the charges.

See Uplinger, 370 N.E.2d at 1058.
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Defendant's

express waivers of his speedy trial rights after returning to
Utah and his multiple pre-trial filings led the trial court into
granting multiple trial continuances at defendant's request.

It

would be incongruous to provide defendant with the protection of
the speedy trial provision of the IAD when he manifested the
clear intent to frustrate the ability of the Utah authorities to
comply with the IAD.

State v. Jensen, 818 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah

1991); Uplinaer, 370 N.E.2d at 1058.

Fundamental fairness

dictates that he not be rewarded for his actions.
There were 589 days from the time defendant claims he
completed the Article III prerequisites on June 4, 1991, until
trial began on January 13, 1993. The delay attributable to
defendant during this period is as follows:
DATES
July 7, 1991
to
Feb. 19, 1992
Feb. 24, 1992
to
April 2, 1992

DAYS ATTRIBUTED
TO DEFENDANT

EVENT
Defendant's letter to
Utah authorities showing his
intent to resist extradition
(R. 332).
Defendant arrives in Utah
under Art. IV (R. 252).17

228

Defendant files a motion to
dismiss (R. 214-34).
Defendant's motion is quashed
(R. 345-46).

39

17

Nothing in the record suggests that defendant ever abandoned
his resistance to extradition. However, his voluntary dismissal of
his federal habeas appeal, albeit on a mistaken belief that all
charges had been dismissed, may arguably demonstrate his
acquiescence to extradition (R. 255, 364). Even utilizing the
December 4, 1991, entry of the order dismissing the federal action,
the Utah trial occurred 161 days into the Article III period.
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May 1, 1992
to

Oct. 5, 1992

Defendant files a motion to
dismiss (R. 211-34) (during
this time, defendant also files
numerous other motions, as
detailed in the Statement of
the Case).
Defendant's motions are denied
(R. 568-73) .

158

Oct. 26, 1992
to
Nov. 18, 1992

Trial is continued from Oct.
to Nov. at defendant's request
in a hearing on Oct. 19
(R. 581-83) (during this time,
defendant also files an
interlocutory appeal and three
motions).

24

Nov. 19, 1992
to

Trial is continued from Nov.
to Jan. per defendant's
motion in a hearing held Nov.
9, 1992 (R. 734-37) (date of
motion unknown; motion granted
Nov. 23, 1992) (during this
time, defendant files three
additional motions).
Trial begins (R. 804-08).

56

Jan. 13, 1993
TOTAL:

505
Once the delay attributable to defendant is considered,

defendant's trial began only 84 days into the Article III period.
Accordingly, there was no IAD violation, and defendant is not
entitled to relief.
C. The State Did Not Violate The Speedy Trial Provisions Of
Article IV Where Trial Began Within The Required 12 0 Days
Defendant contends that the 120-day period under
Article IV was not met because there is no evidence in the record
that defendant was "unable to stand trial" under Article VI, and
there is no ruling from the trial court regarding a good cause

40

delay.

Br. of App. at 25-26.18

Although the case cited by

defendant, United States v. Birdwell, 983 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir.
1993), supports defendant's position, the overwhelming weight of
authority is to the contrary:

delays attributable to defendant

are excluded from the time computations under the IAD, including
Article IV.

See United States v. Walker, 924 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st

Cir. 1991) (120 days tolled by defense motions); People v.
Harlan, 344 N.W.2d 300, 301-02 (Mich. App. 1983) (Article IV
period is tolled for any period of delay necessary to accommodate
defendant); State v. Knox, 848 P.2d 1354, 1359 (Wyo. 1993) (120
days tolled by defendant's numerous pre-trial motions); see also
authorities cited in subsection (B)(2), supra. Moreover,
defendant, through his trial counsel, filed a letter on October
20, 1992, which attributes part of the delay since his arrival in
Utah to his own two motions to dismiss, and which admits that the
November 18 trial date would fall within the 120-day period of
Article IV (R. 583). Addendum D.

The November setting was

ultimately moved to January 13, 1993, based on defendant's own
motion for a continuance and his express waiver of his IAD rights
(R. 734-37) . Addendum C.

Having led the trial court to believe

that no IAD violation would arise from either the November or
January dates, defendant cannot now assert error in these
18

Defendant's argument references, without a record cite, a
demand he allegedly made on May 2, 1992, for an immediate
arraignment and trial setting.
Br. of App. at 26. The only
document in the record filed by defendant near that day is his
motion to dismiss, filed May 1, 1992 (R. 211-34) . The motion does
not contain any request for an immediate arraignment or trial
setting.
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continuances.

See Parsons v. Barnes, 23 0 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4-5

(Utah 1994); State v. Smith. 776 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah App. 1989).
Further, the absence of any express ruling from the trial court
concerning "good cause" may be attributed to defendant's express
waivers, which would have left the court no reason to believe
that it was required to do more than it did.
Trial began on January 13, 1993, 329 days after
defendant arrived in Utah on February 19, 1992.

As shown by the

chart in the previous subsection, 277 days were attributable to
defendant's delay, with the result that defendant was brought to
trial within 52 days under Article IV.

Consequently, defendant

was brought to trial within the constraints of the 120-day period
of Article IV, and he is not entitled to relief on appeal.
D. Defendant's Claim Of An Article V Violation Does Not State A
Claim For Which Relief Is Appropriate: Moreover, The Alleged
Delay In Extraditing Defendant To Utah Under Article IV Does Not
Entitle Defendant To Withdrawal Of His Pleas Or Dismissal
Defendant argues that the State violated his rights
under Article V(e) of the IAD because it did not "transport the
defendant in a timely manner after the offer of temporary custody
had been provided by federal authorities in Minnesota on August
26, 1991."

Br. of App. at 23.

However, Article V(e) provides:

At the earliest practicable time consonant with
the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be
returned to the sending state.
(Emphasis added.)

Addendum A.

In this case, the sending state

is Minnesota, where the Sandstone facility is located.

Nothing

in Article V requires that Utah take immediate custody of
defendant once an offer of temporary custody is made by
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Sandstone, as defendant contends. Addendum A.

Accordingly,

defendant has not stated a cognizable claim for relief under
Article V.
Defendant also argues that the delay in returning him
to Utah after Sandstone's offer of temporary custody violated
Article IV.

Br. of App. at 23. However, nothing in Article IV

dictates that Utah take immediate custody of defendant.
A.

Addendum

To the contrary, the provisions of Article IV contemplate an

exchange of information between the two states, which necessarily
takes time. Addendum A.

Article IV also provides for a 3 0-day

delay upon the motion of the prisoner or the custodial state's
governor.

IAD, Art. IV(a); Addendum A.

Contrary to defendant's

claim that "there were no administrative delays in the sending
jurisdiction which would have prevented Defendant's return[,]"
Br. of App. at

24, Utah authorities were delayed in their

efforts to obtain custody of defendant by his resistance to
extradition and his invocation of the 3 0-day period under Article
IV(a), which the Sandstone authorities honored.

Defendant cannot

actively delay his return to Utah, then claim a right to
dismissal of the charges because he was not returned fast enough.
Further, dismissal under Article IV is neither required
nor warranted for such a delay.

The prisoner himself may remedy

any delay between the charging state's written request for
temporary custody and its extradition of the prisoner under
Article IV by filing a written request for disposition under
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Article III. Defendant failed to file any Article III request
after Utah began its Article IV proceedings (Tr. 22).
State v. Peterson, 585 P.2d 66 (Wash. 1978), relied
upon by defendant, is inapplicable to this case because it
involved interpretation of Washington's local speedy trial rule,
which the Washington Supreme Court expressly distinguished from
the interstate statute.

Id. at 70. Unlike this case, it also

involved a concession by the State that it made no effort to
locate defendant or determine his availability despite
defendant's multiple attempts to invoke the local rule.
Moreover, the "diligent effort" requirement for which defendant
cites the case expressly requires consideration of defendant's
resistance to extradition as a factor in determining whether the
state acted reasonably in its efforts to obtain custody.
69.

Id. at

In this case, defendant's resistance to extradition and his

invocation of Article I V s 30-day period would render Utah's
actions reasonable.
POINT III
DEFENDANT'S UNCONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA WAIVED HIS CLAIMS
OF PRE-PLEA CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS, AND HIS FAILURE TO INCLUDE THE ARGUMENT AS
A BASIS TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA BELOW WAIVES THE ISSUE FOR
APPEAL; HENCE, THIS COURT NEED NOT REACH THE MERITS OF
DEFENDANT'S SECOND ARGUMENT
The argument presented in this Point responds to the
argument in Point II of defendant's brief.

Br. of App. at 27-32.

Defendant's second argument alleges that the State
violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial under the
United States Constitution, the Utah Constitution, and Utah
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statutory law, because he was originally charged in October 1989
but was not tried until January 1993. Br. of App. at 27-28.
Outlining the constitutional speedy trial factors set forth in
Barker v. Winao, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192 (1972),
defendant claims that the delay entitles him to dismissal of the
charges.

Id. at 28-32.
However, this Court need not reach defendant's argument

that the State violated his constitutional speedy trial rights
for two reasons.

First, defendant claims that the trial court

improperly denied his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas but
fails to advance the appropriate standard of review or legal
authorities relevant to a review of the trial court's ruling or
withdrawal of his pleas.

Utah R. App. P. 24(5) and (9) J

Second, defendant waived this constitutional argument
by his express waivers in open court (Addendum C), by the
language of the plea agreement (R. 856; Addendum E), and by
entering an unconditional guilty plea.

See Point 1(B), supra;

see also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602,
1608 (1973) ("When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in
open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he
is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims
relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that
occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.11); State ex rel.
E.G.T., 808 P.2d 138, 139 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Serv, 758
P.2d 935, 937-38 (Utah App. 1988).
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Even if defendant intends that the alleged
constitutional violation constitutes a basis for withdrawal of
his guilty pleas, the argument would not properly be before this
Court because it was not presented to the trial court in
defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas (R. 872-75; Addendum F),
and defendant makes no assertion of plain error or exceptional
circumstances to excuse his failure to present the issue to the
trial court.

See State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 705 n.2 (Utah

App. 1993); State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 (Utah App.
1992) .
POINT IV
THIS COURT NEED NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S ASSERTIONS OF DUE
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS OR HIS RES
JUDICATA CONCERNS BECAUSE THEY WERE WAIVED BY ENTRY OF
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEAS, AND BECAUSE THEY ARE RAISED
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AND NO CLAIM OF PLAIN
ERROR OR EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES IS MADE
The argument presented in this Point responds to the
argument in Point III of defendant's brief.

Br. of App. at 32-

36.
In his final argument, defendant contends that the Utah
charges should be dismissed because his due process and equal
protection rights were violated by the State or the lower court
in the following ways:
1. the State filed no probable cause statement,
despite his arrest on July 13, 1989;
2. the court did not set a trial date within 30 days
of his not guilty plea on October 19, 1989;
3. defendant was not present when the district court
dismissed the first information on November 6, 1989, or
held a hearing on March 26, 1990;
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4. the court failed to include in its order of
dismissal dated November 6, 1989, the express reasons
for the ruling;
5. the State did not give defendant a copy of the
information dated December 21, 1989, until twenty-six
months after it was filed;
6. the court did not appoint counsel to represent
defendant in response to his requests of June 5, 1990,
March 16, 1991, and April 30, 1991; and
7. the prosecutor did not inform the district court of
the December 21 information filed in the circuit court
so that the district court could forward defendant's
alleged IAD request to the appropriate court or respond
to defendant.
Br. of App. at 32-35.

Defendant also contends that the

prosecutor failed to inform either the district court or the
federal court of the existence of the second information, thereby
resulting in rulings from both courts that no charges were
pending against defendant.

Id. at 35-36.

He argues that the

doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel require that
these rulings be enforced, thereby dictating that the charges
against him be dismissed.

Id.

In addition to the fact that these arguments were
necessarily waived by entry of the unconditional guilty pleas,
State ex rel. E.G.T.. 808 P.2d 138, 139 (Utah App. 1991) (a
voluntary guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional issues); State
v. Perank. 858 P.2d 927, 931 n.3 (Utah 1992) (res judicata is
waivable), all except the res judicata issue are raised for the
first time on appeal.

Because defendant asserts neither plain

error nor exceptional circumstances, this Court should not
address the merits of these claims.

C7

State v. Martinez. 848 P.2d

702, 705 n.2 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913,
917-18 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 925
(Utah App. 1991).
CONCLUSION
Defendant seeks a remand to the district court for
withdrawal of his guilty pleas, together with directions to the
lower court to dismiss the charges against him.
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully
requests that this Court affirm defendant's convictions and
/

sentences.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this C&Q

day of July, 1994.

JAN GRAHAM,
Attorney

C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed by first class mail,
postage prepaid, to Herm Olsen, Hillyard, Anderson & Olsen,
attorney for appellant, 175 East 100 North, Logan , Utah
this gpfo^aay of July, 1994
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
interstate Agreement On Detainers

77-29-2

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

trial State v Carlsen, 25 Utah 2d 136, 478
P2d 326 (1970)
Premature request.
Defendant's request for final disposition was
premature where proceedings had advanced
only to point offilingof complaint against htm,
since person accused of felony must plead to
and be tried under information or indictment
State v. Belcher, 25 Utah 2d 37, 475 P 2d 60
(1970)
Defendant, who was not finally tried within
ninety days from date of request made pursuant to former § 77-65-1, was not entitled to
exoneration because his request was premature since only complaint for felony charge had
been filed, good cause was shown for granting
continuance, and insanity defense had precluded earlier trial. State v. Belcher, 25 Utah
2d 37, 475 P 2d 60 (1970)
Parolee who, after being arrested on complaint, filed petition requesting final disposition of case within ninety days was denied relief under former ft 77-65-1, where trial was
held more than ninety days after filing date of
petition but within ninety days of filing of information State v. Clark, 28 Utah 2d 272,501
P 2d 274 (1972)
Former ft 77-65-1 did not apply to unfiled
charges and defendant was not entitled to assert ninety-day limitation upon prosecution for
any crime discovered or undiscovered he might
have committed State v. Farnsworth, 30 Utah
2d 435, 619 P 2d 244 (1974).
Prosecutor's delay.
A prosecutor's delay in filing charges does

not violate defendant's right to a speedy trial
where no tactical advantage is gained over the
defendant, since a strict rule that prosecutors
must file charges as soon as probable cause
exists could result in the charging of innocent
people, and could also hamper the investigation of crimes State v Smith, 699 P 2d 711
(Utah 1985)
Warden's delay.
Any attempt by the warden to retain, beyond
a reasonable time, a prisoner's request for final
disposition of pending charges, his failure to
complete the required certificate, or any attempt to misdirect the request and certificate,
would violate prisoner's right to a speedy trial
and provide a basis for judicial relief State v
Taylor, 538 P 2d 310 (Utah 1975)
Written demand.
Defendant's reliance on his notice of appearance to commence the running of the 120-day
period within which his trial had to be held
was misplaced since the notice, which merely
contained a plea of "not guilty" and a request
that he be granted a trial upon the charge, was
not delivered to the warden, and did not specify
the nature of the charge or the court where the
charge was pending State v. Viles, 702 P2d
1175 (Utah 1985)
A letter from defendant's federal probation
officer to a Utah county attorney which did not
specify the nature of the charges pending
against defendant, was merely an inquiry and
did not trigger the statutory right to demand
trial State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447 (Utah
1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am, Jur. 2d. — 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law §5 849-875.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law •» 573-576.

77-29-2. Duty of custodial officer to inform prisoner of
untried indictments or informations.
The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall promptly inform a prisoner in
writing of the source and contents of any untried indictments or informations
against that prisoner concerning which he has knowledge and of that prisoner's right to make a request for final disposition thereof.
History: C. 1963, 77-29-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, ft 2.
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77-29-3. Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons.
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any person while adjudged
to be incompetent to proceed under Chapter 15.
History: C. 1963, 77-29-3, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, ft 2.

77-29-4. Escape of prisoner voids demand.
Escape from custody by a prisoner after delivery of the written demand
referred to in Subsection 77-29-1(1) shall void the request.
History: C. 1963, 77-29-4, enacted by L.
1960, ch. 15, ft 2.

77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment
into law — Text of agreement.
The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby enacted into law and entered into by this state with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in
the form substantially as follows:
The contracting states solemnly agree that:
ARTICLE I
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers
based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in
securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions,
produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and
rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose
of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such
charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based
on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find
that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of cooperative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide
such co-operative procedures.
ARTICLE II
As used in this agreement:
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States of
America; a territory or possession of the United States; District of Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcerated at the time that he initiates a request for final dispositions pursuant
to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability ia initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof.
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had on
an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Article
IV hereof.
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ARTICLE III

any court where his presence may be required in order to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to the
original place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent
sentence if otherwise permitted by law.
(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of the
request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall void the
request.

(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal
or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state
any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a
detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial
within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting
officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for
good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the
court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable
continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate
of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served,
the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time
earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the
state parole agency relating to the prisoner.
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall
promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody
of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any
detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his right to make a
request for final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint on
which the detainer is based.
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all untried
indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which detainers have
been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting official
the request for final disposition is specifically directed. The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the prisoner shall
forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts in the several
jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner's request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied by copies of the
prisoner's written notice, request, and the certificate. If trial is not had on any
indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return
of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court
shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to a paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with
respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein
by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to the receiving
state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after completion of his
term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request for final disposition
shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the production of his body in
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ARTICLE IV
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner
against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with Article V(a) hereof
upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or availability to
the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated;
provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment, information or
complaint shall have duly approved, recorded and transmitted the request;
and provided further that there shall be a period of 30 days after receipt by
the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within which period the governor of the sending state may disapprove the request for temporary custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion of the
prisoner.
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in paragraph (a)
hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of commitment under which
the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be
served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole
eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other
officers and appropriate courts in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner with similar certificates and with notices informing them of the request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor.
(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be
commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in
the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his
counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant
any necessary or reasonable continuance.
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to deprive any prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his delivery as
provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be opposed or
denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not
affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery.
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of
imprisonment pursuant to Article V(e) hereof, such indictment, information
or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall
enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
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ARTICLE V

of the sending state, the state in which the one or more untried indictments,
informations or complaints are pending or in which trial is being had shall be
responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring
for, keeping and returning the prisoner The provisions of this paragraph
shall govern unless the states concerned shall have entered into a supplementary agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as between or among themselves Nothing herein contained shall be construed to alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments,
agencies and officers of and in the government of a party state, or between a
party state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities
therefor

(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, the
appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where such
indictment, information or complaint is pending against such person in order
that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had If the request for final
disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of this agreement In
the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in the receiving state
shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided by this agreement or to the
prisoner's presence in federal custody at the place for trial, whichever custodial arrangement may be approved by the custodian
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of temporary custody shall present the following upon demand
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the
state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint on
the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which
the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary
custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment,
information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is
not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV
hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the
same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any
force or effect
(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only for
the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in
one or more untried indictments, informations or complaints which form the
basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or
charges arising out of the same transaction Except for his attendance at court
and while being transported to or from any place at which his presence may be
required, the prisoner shall be held in a suitable jail or other facility regularly
used for persons awaiting prosecution
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this
agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner is
otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, time
being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall be
earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of
the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain
in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and any
escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as an
escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner permitted by law
(h) From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant
to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody
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ARTICLE VI
(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods
provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said time
periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to
stand tnal, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter.
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by this
agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill.
ARTICLE VH
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting
jointly With like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this
agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information
necessary to the effective operation of this agreement.
ARTICLE V m
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state when
such state has enacted the same into law A state party to this agreement may
withdraw herefrom enacting a statute repealing the same However, the withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any proceedings already
initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time such withdrawal takes
effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect thereof.
ARTICLE IX
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes
The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any phrase, clause,
sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be contrary to the Constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof
to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this agreement and the applicability thereof to any
government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby If
this agreement shall be held contrary to the Constitution of any state party
hereto, the agreement shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining
states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable
matters
655

77-29-5

UTAH CODE OP CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

C o m p l i a n c e standard.
The standard to which administration of the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers should be
held is substantial compliance with the terms
of the agreement and fundamental fairness in
the overall result Hearn v. State, 642 P.2d 757
(Utah 1982).
The substantial compliance doctrine does not
dispense with the need for a written notice and
request by the prisoner under Article IH(b) of
this section. State v. Martin, 765 P.2d 854
(Utah 1988).
Detainer required.
Under Article IH(a) of this section, a detainer must be lodged against the prisoner before he can invoke Article III protection. State
v. Martin, 765 P.2d 854 (Utah 1988).
J u r i s d i c t i o n retained by sending state.
California prisoner's transfer to Utah did not
constitute waiver and relinquishment of jurisdiction by California or satisfaction of the California judgment where the transfer was made
pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers as requested by the prisoner; fact that
prisoner entered guilty pleas to misdemeanors
and not felonies in Utah, and fact that Utah
sentence provided that time be served in the
county jail with such sentence to run concurrently with the California sentence, had no effect on California's continued jurisdiction over
the prisoner. Buchanan v. Hayward, 663 P.2d
70 (Utah 1983).
Notice to prosecutor and court.
A communication solely to the prosecuting
officer does not meet the requirements of Article IH(a) of this section calling for written notice to both the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's ju«

77-29-9

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

History: C. 1953, 77-20-5, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, ft 2.

Compliance standard.
Detainer required.
Jurisdiction retained by sending state.
Notice to prosecutor and court.
Prisoner received under Western Interstate
Corrections Compact.
Sentence interrupted for return to sending
state.
Time limit for trial.
—Between counties.
—Delay caused by defendant.

DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS

risdiction. State v. Martin, 765 P.2d 854 (Utah
1988).
Prisoner received u n d e r Western Interstate C o r r e c t i o n s Compact.
Where prisoner was convicted and sentenced
by an Oregon court and was transferred to
Utah for confinement in the Utah State Prison
under the Western Interstate Corrections Compact, § 77-28-1 et seq., and, while in confinement in Utah, California made a request under
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers to Utah
officials for temporary custody of prisoner to
try him on kidnapping and rape charges pending in California, Utah officials did not have
authority under the Western Interstate Corrections Compact or the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers to transfer custody of prisoner to
California without the direction or approval of
the Oregon authorities; California could obtain
such approval by making its request directly to
Oregon or by having its request forwarded by
the Utah officials to the Oregon authorities.
Gibson v. Morris, 646 P.2d 733 (Utah 1982).
Sentence interrupted for return to sending
state.
There was substantial compliance with the
terms of this Agreement and no violation of
fundamental fairness in the fact that prisoner's
service of sentence in the receiving state was
interrupted for his return to the sending state
and is to be resumed, pursuant to detainer
from the receiving state, after he completes
service of his sentence in the sending state and
an intervening federal sentence. Hearn v.
State, 642 P 2d 757 (Utah 1982).

Utah Law Review. — Note, The State University's Place Among Overlapping Police Jurisdictions During a Student Mass Disturbance, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 474.

A.L.R. — Validity, construction, and application of Interstate Agreement on Detainers,
98 A.L.R.3d 160.

77-29-6. Interstate agreement — "Appropriate court" defined. f
The phrase "appropriate court" as used in the agreement on detainers shall,
with reference to the courts of this state, mean any court with criminal jurisdiction in the matter involved.
History: C. 1953, 77-29-6, enacted by L.
1900, ch. 15, ft 2.

77-29-7. Interstate agreement — Duty of state agencies
and political subdivisions to co-operate.
All courts, departments, agencies, officers and employees of this state and
its political subdivisions are hereby directed to enforce the agreement on
detainers and to co-operate with one another and with other party states in
enforcing the agreement and effectuating its purpose.
History: C. 1953, 77-29-7, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 15, § 2.

77-29-8. Interstate agreement — Application of habitual
criminal law.
Nothing in the agreement on detainers shall be construed to require the
application of the habitual criminal law of this state to any person as a result
of any conviction had in a proceeding brought to final disposition by reason of
the use of said agreement.

Time limit for trial.
—Between counties.
An arrest warrant filed by one county with a
sister county does not constitute an Article IV
request for temporary custody of a sending
state's prisoner so as to trigger the 120-day
time limit. State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137
(Utah 1989).
—Delay caused by defendant.
If the defendant himself causes the trial to
be delayed beyond the 120-day period in Article IV(c), the defendant cannot assert the delay
as a basis for dismissal of the charges against
him. State v. Stillings, 709 P.2d 348 (Utah
1985).

History: C. 1953, 77-29-8, enacted by L.
1960, ch. 15, I 2.
ft*

Cross-References. — Habitual criminals,
76-8-1001, 76-8-1002.

77-29-9. Interstate agreement — Escape of prisoner while
in temporary custody.
Escape or attempt to escape from custody, whether within or without this
state, while in the temporary custody of an authority of another state acting
pursuant to the agreement on detainers shall constitute an offense against
this state. Such escape or attempt to escape shall constitute an offense to the
same extent and degree as an escape from the institution in which the prisoner was confined immediately prior to having been released to temporary
custody, and shall be punishable in the same manner as an escape or attempt
to escape from said institution.
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ADDENDUM B
Defendant's February 7, 1990, Letter

February 7, 1990

Sheriff of Mercer County
Mercer County Jail
Aledo, IL 61231
RE:

Pending Utah Charges and Federal
Court (III) v. Jack Brocksmith

Dear Sheriff:
Pursuant to Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 38, Sec. 1003-8-9, et seq.,
I request a final dispoistion of all charges pending in Utah*
I understand the Mercer County Sheriff is to forward this
request with a statement of the terms of my present imprisonment to the prosecuting authorities. I also understand this
request waives extradition on these charges.
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ADDENDUM C
Minute Entries Dated
May 11, 1992
June 8, 1992
October 13, 1992
And Order Continuing Trial

ffflgnm&mfsreiXFmsTRiCT couRt
** ••«
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M^fMUTf^MfTRY' - NOTICE
Date:

MAY 11, 1992

vs.

Case No:

921000051

JACK D BROCKSMITH,

Judge:

GORDON J. LOW

Defendant.

Clerk:

LRD

(Jail)

Tape: VIDEO

Plaintiff,

FS

Count:

ARRAIGNMENT - NOT GUILTY PLEA
This case is before the court for ARRAIGNMENT on the charges of
(1)

(2)
<3>
(4)

<5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)

THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
COMM FRAUD
COMM FRAUD
THEFT BY DEC
COMM FRAUD
THEFT BY DEC
COMM FRAUD
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
Appearing for the State is GARY 0. MCKEAN.

present.

(First Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(First Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Third Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
The defendant is

Appearing as counsel for the defendant is BARBARA LACHMAR.

A copy of the information is given to the defendant.
information is rea6 in open court.

The

Case Numbers 921000Q51£,F£
After the court examined the defendant, the defendant enters
a plea of not guilty to:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(13)
(14)
(15)

THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
COMM FRAUD
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC

(First Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Third Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)

The court schedules the following on the date indicated:
EVENT:
DATE :
TIME :
PLACE:

MOTION HEARING
JUNE 8, 1992
9:19 AM
Room 3

ADDRESS: CACHE CO HALL OF JUSTICE
140 NORTH 100 WEST
LOGAN, UT 84321
JUDGE : GORDON J. LOW

The court orders that the defendant be remanded to the custody of
the County Sheriff.
MOTION TO DISMISS HAS BEEN FILED AND STATE HAS NOT RESPONDED YET-COURT STATES THAT A MOTION FOR A SPEEDY TRIAL IS NOT APPLICABLE—
THE CHARGES ARE READ AND THE DEFENDANT PLEADS NOT GUILTY—STATE
REQUESTS A TRIAL SETTING—DEFENDANT WAIVES TIME—A MOTION HEARING IS
TO BE SET AFTER THIRTY DAYS AND JURY TRIAL IS TO BE SET BEFORE SIXTY
DAYS

2.3b

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY - NOTICE

STATE OF UTAH,

Date:

JUNE 8, 1992

vs.

Case No:

921000051

JACK D BROCKSMITH,

Judge:

GORDON J. LOW

Defendant.

Clerk:

LRD

(Jail)

Tape: VIDEO

Plaintiff,

FS

Count:

HEARING
This case is before the court for MOTION HEARING on the charges
Of
<1>

(2)
(3)
<4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)

THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
COMM FRAUD
COMM FRAUD
THEFT BY DEC
COMM FRAUD
THEFT BY DEC
COMM FRAUD
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
Appearing for the State is GARY O. MCKEAN.

present.

(First Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(First Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Third Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
The defendant is

Appearing as counsel for the defendant is BARBARA LACHMAR.

DEFENSE HAS FILED TWO MOTIONS AND REQUESTS CONTINUATION—DEFENDANT
WAIVES HIS SPEEDY TRIAL TIME—A TWO HOUR MOTION HEARING IS TO BE SET

:>-?£

Case Number: 921000051 FS
FOR ORAL ARGUMENT—THE TRIAL DATE THAT IS SET IS TO BE VACATED AND
RE-SET
The court orders that the defendant be remanded to the custody of
the County Sheriff.
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

MINUTE ENTRY - NOTICE

Plaintiff,

Date:

OCTOBER 13, 1992

vs.

Case No:

921000051

JACK D BROCKSMITH,

Judge:

GORDON J. LOW

Defendant.

Clerk:

LRD

(Jail)

Reporter:

FS

VIDEO

HEARING
This case is before the court for PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE on the
char ges of
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

(ID

(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)

THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
COMM FRAUD
COMM FRAUD
THEFT BY DEC
COMM FRAUD
THEFT BY DEC
COMM FRAUD
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
THEFT BY DEC
Appearing for the State is GARY 0. MCKEAN.

present.

(First Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(First Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Third Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
(Second Degree Felony)
The defendant is

Appearing as counsel for the defendant is BARBARA LACHMAR.

THE DEFENDANT IS PRESENT WITH COUNSEL—TWO MOTIONS HAVE BEEN DENIED—
A THREE DAY JURY TRIAL IS TO BE SET SOON--ATD WILL FILE AN

<zn°i

Case Number: 921000051 FS
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL AND OTHER MOTIONS—DEFENDANT WAIVES INTERSTATE
AGREEMENT TIME
The court orders that the defendant be remanded to the custody of
the County Sheriff.
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Gary O. McKcan

**?*

140 North 100 West
Logan, Utah 84321
RE:

State v. Jack Brocksmith
Crim. No. 921000051

Dear Judge Low:
The Defendant's Notion to Continue and the actions of the
Court in this matter on November 9, 1992, were never confirmed in
a written order. Because of the nature of the case and the need
for a complete documented record, the State requests that the
attached proposed Findings and Order be signed by the Court and
placed in the Court's file in this case. A copy has been submitted
to Barbara King Lachmar, counsel for Defendant.
If she has any
objections to this Order we request that they be made within a
reasonable time and if no objection is pee^ived within a reasonable
time that the Court sign the Order^s^swomitted.
'fully submitted,

Cache County Attorney
GOM:cag
cc:

Barbara King Lachmar

73?

LOGC A, t •
R. PAUL VAN DAM - 3312
Attorney General
C. C. HORTON II - 1542
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016

Nov 10

r, • •;

I 07 Pii J 3Z

GARY O. McKEAN - 2201
Cache County Attorney
Attorney for the State of Utah
110 North 100 West
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 752-8920

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER CONTINUING TRIAL
Plaintiff,
vs.
JACK D. BROCKSMITH,

District Court No: 921000051
(Circuit Court No: 891001462)

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court upon the Motion of the
Defendant

for a continuance of the three

(3) day jury trial

scheduled in this case, for the three (3) days beginning November
18, 1992.

The Defendant was present and was represented by his

counsel, Barbara King Lachmar. The State was represented by James
C. Jenkins, Deputy Cache County Attorney.
The Court finds that the Defendant has filed a Petition with
the Utah Supreme Court for an Interlocutory Appeal from the Order
of this Court denying the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion

i

-^-#43
NOV 2 3 1992
^

to Invalidate transfer and request for relief;

that petition is

currently pending before the Utah Supreme Court;

the Defendant

claims that the issues raised in his Motion for Dismissal and
Motion to Invalidate Transfer and Request for Relieve ought to be
considered by the Utah Supreme through an Interlocutory Appeal
prior to the commencement of trial; the Defendant has filed a
Motion to Sever and an Amended Motion to Sever, a Motion to
Suppress, and

a Motion to Suppress

Bank Records, which the

Defendant claims need to be considered and heard by this Court and
a decision made thereon prior to trial; that the Defendant has been
advised and acknowledged that he is entitled to have his trial
commence in this matter within the 120 day period provided by
Article IV of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers as set forth in
§77-29-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; that the Defendant
has knowingly and voluntarily in open court this day waived his
right to a speedy trial and to the commencement of trial in the
above-referenced case within the 120 day period provided by the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers;

that the Defendant has made

this waiver and Motion to Continue after consultation with his
legal counsel; that the Defendant has consented to the striking of
the three (3) day jury trial commencing November 18, 1992, and to
the re-scheduling of that trial to commence on January 13, 1993;
and

that

the

State

has

consented

to

the

continuance

and

rescheduling of the trial to January 13, 1993.

2
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It is thereupon ordered that the trial scheduled to commence
on November 18, 1992, be continued and rescheduled to commence
January 13, 1993; that the Defendant has waived his right to a
speedy trial and to the commencement of a trial of this case within
the

120 day period

provided

by the

Interstate Agreement

on

Detainers; and that the Defendant's Motion to Sever, Amended Motion
to Sever, Motion to Suppress, Motion to Suppress Bank Records shall
be heard on November 18, 1992, at 1:30 p.m..
DATED this ^ H day of November, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

\x

^GORDON J. LOW
District Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

Barbara King Lachmar
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the proposed
foregoing Order for Continuance were delivered this date to Barbara
King Lachmar, Attorney for Defendant, at her mailbox at the
District Court.
DATED this £4* day of November,

1992.

Legdl Assistant/
FINDING2.DOC
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ADDENDUM D
Letter to District Court
From Defense Counsel
Dated October 20, 1992

BARBARA K I N G L A C H M A R
Attorney at Law

Post Office Bo* 4432
Logan, Utan 84523-4432
(801) 753-2979

, f\ r
u b J

f
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October 20, 1992
Honorable Gordon J. Low
First District Court
140 North 100 West
Logan, UT 84321
Re:

State of Utah v. Jack D. Brocksmith

Dear Judge Low,
I have reviewed the table provided by the State with regard to
the time remaining, within which, the State must bring the abovenamed defendant to trial under Article IV of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers.
According to my calculations, the State has 70 days from October
5, 1992, in which to bring the defendant to trial. The defendant
arrived in Utah on February 19, 1992. Defendant's attorney filed
the first Motion to Dismiss on February 24, 1992. The State
filed a Motion to Quash the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on
March 17, 1992. The Motion to Quash was granted on April 2,
1992. Defendant filed his second Motion to Dismiss on May 1,
1992, defendant's Motion to Dismiss was denied by this Court on
October 5, 1992. Accordingly, 50 days of the time since
defendant arrived in Utah are attributable to the State and 70
days remain from the date of denial of defendant's Motion to
Dismiss during which defendant must be brought to trial.
Defendant's trial is currently scheduled for November 18, 19 and
20, 1992. Those dates are within 70 days from October 5, 1992
and accordingly fall within the 120-day guideline under Article
IV.
Sincerely,

Barbara King Laqjnmar
Attorney for the Defendant
cc:

Jack D. Brocksmith
Cache County Attorney

FILED)

OCT 2 0 1992

ADDENDUM E
Statement of Defendant and Plea Agreement

JAN GRAHAM - 1231
Attorney General
C. C. HORTON II - 1542
Assistant Attorney General
MICHAEL D. WIMS - 4720
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016
GARY 0. MCKEAN - 2201
Cache County Attorney
110 North 100 West
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 752-8920
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
AND PLEA AGREEMENT

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Circuit Ct. No. 891001462
District Ct. No. 921000051

JACK D. BROCKSMITH,
D.O.B. 04-05-38

Judge Gordon J. Low

Defendant.

I, Jack D. Brocksmith, the Defendant in this case,
state as follows with respect to my entry of pleas of guilty in
the above-captioned case:
1.

I hereby confirm the entry of my voluntary plea

of guilty to the following:
Count 1: Communications Fraud, a Second Degree Felony;
AND
Count 2: Communications Fraud, a Second Degree Felony;
AND
Count 3: Communications Fraud, a Second Degree Felony;

fco
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AND
Count 4: Communications Fraud, a Second Degree Felony;
AND
Count 5: Communications Fraud, a Second Degree Felony;
AND
Count 6: Communications Fraud, a Second Degree Felony.
2.

I have received and read a copy of the Second

Amended Information filed against me in this case.
3.

I understand the nature and the elements of the

offense to which I am pleading guilty.
4.

The elements of the offenses for the crimes to

which I am pleading guilty are as follows:
Counts 1 through 6:

Communications Fraud, Second

Degree Felonies.
A.

Elements of the offenses:

i.

That the defendant, having devised a scheme or

artifice to defraud another or to obtain from another money or
anything of value by means of communicating false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, promises or material omissions;
ii.

On or about the dates alleged, in the counties

alleged, in the State of Utah, communicate directly or indirectly
with any person by any means; and
ill.

The communications were for the purpose of

executing or concealing the scheme; and
iv.

The pretenses, representations, promises, or

material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted
2
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intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the
truth; and
v.

The total value of all money or things obtained or

sought to be obtained from all victims by the scheme or artifice
was $10,000 or more.
B.

My conduct for which I am criminally liable, which

constitutes the elements of the crimes charged is as follows:
COUNT 1
I was an insurance agent representing Equitable Life
and Casualty Co.

On March 19, 1988, acting as an insurance

agent, in Cache County, Utah, I represented to Gosta Eckstrom
that I was selling him an annuity policy.

I obtained a check

from him for $40,000 for the policy and did not forward the money
to the company.

At the time I obtained his money, I knowingly

did not tell him that I intended to use the money for any purpose
other than purchasing the annuity policy.

I acknowledge that my

failure to tell him that I intended to use the money for other
purposes constituted a material omission, and therefore I
obtained the money through false pretenses or through material
omissions.
I understand the minimum and maximum sentence that
may be imposed upon me for the offense.

The penalty provided by

statute for the offense in Count 1 is one to fifteen years
imprisonment.

I also understand that the offense carries a

maximum fine of $10,000.
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COUNT 2
I was an insurance agent representing
Transamerica/Occidental Life.

On August 19, 1988, September 24,

1988, and October 28, 1988, in Cache and/or Davis County, Utah,
acting as an insurance agent, I represented to Rose and Heber
Hart that I was selling them an annuity policy.

On the dates

indicated, I obtained three $10,000 checks from Rose and Heber
Hart for the policy and did not forward the money to the company.
At the time I obtained their money, I knowingly did not tell them
that I intended to use the money for any purpose other than
purchasing the annuity policy.

I acknowledge that my failure to

tell them that I intended to use the money for other purposes
constituted a material omission, and therefore I obtained the
money through false pretenses or through material omissions.
I understand the minimum and maximum sentence that
may be imposed upon me for the offense.

The penalty provided by

statute for the offense in Count 2 is one to fifteen years
imprisonment.

I also understand that the offense carries a

maximum fine of $10,000.
COUNT 3
I was an insurance agent representing
Transamerica/Occidental Life. On November 1, 1988, in Davis
and/or Cache County, Utah, acting as an insurance agent, I
represented to Sybil Pollard that I was selling her an annuity
policy.

On the date indicated, I obtained a check for $30,000

from her for the policy and did not forward the money to the
4
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company.

At the time I obtained her money, I knowingly did not

tell her that I intended to use the money for any purpose other
than purchasing the annuity policy.

I acknowledge that my

failure to tell her that I intended to use the money for other
purposes constituted a material omission, and therefore I
obtained the money through false pretenses or through material
omissions.
I understand the minimum and maximum sentence that
may be imposed upon me for the offense.

The penalty provided by

statute for the offense in Count 3 is one to fifteen years
imprisonment.

I also understand that the offense carries a

maximum fine of $10,000.
COUNT 4
I was an insurance agent representing Pioneer Life
Insurance Company.

On December 28, 1988, in Cache County, Utah,

acting as an insurance agent, I represented to Jeanne Weeks that
I was selling her an annuity policy.

On the date indicated, I

obtained a check for $20,000 from her for the policy and did not
forward the money to the company.

At the time I obtained her

money, I knowingly did not tell her that I intended to use the
money for any purpose other than purchasing the annuity policy.
I acknowledge that my failure to tell her that I intended to use
the money for other purposes constituted a material omission, and
therefore I obtained the money through false pretenses or through
material omissions.
I understand the minimum and maximum sentence that

5

may be imposed upon me for the offense.

The penalty provided by

statute for the offense in Count 4 is one to fifteen years
imprisonment.

I also understand that the offense carries a

maximum fine of $10,000.
COUNT 5
I was an insurance agent representing Pioneer Life
Insurance Company.

On December 8, 1988, April 27, 1989, May 8,

1989, and June 15, 1989, acting as an insurance agent, I
represented to Edith Bingham that I was selling her a nursing
home policy.

On December 8, 1988, I obtained a check for

$1,471.00 from her for the policy and did not forward the money
to the company.

On April 27, 1989, I obtained a check for

$2,020.00 from her for the policy and did not forward the money
to the company.

On May 8, 1989, I obtained a check for $406.00

from her for the policy and did not forward the money to the
company.

On June 15, 1989, I obtained a check for $3,111.69 from

her for the policy and did not forward the money to the company.
At the time I obtained some of her money, I knowingly did not
tell her that I had ceased being an agent for that company on
February 13, 1989. Also at the time I obtained her money I
knowingly did not tell her that I intended to use the money for
any purpose other than purchasing the annuity policy.

I

acknowledge that my failure to tell her that I intended to use
the money for other purposes and that I had ceased being an agent
for the company constituted a material omission, and therefore I
obtained the money through false pretenses or through material

omissions.

I acknowledge that the total value obtained from all

victims exceeds $10,000.
I understand the minimum and maximum sentence that
may be imposed upon me for the offense.

The penalty provided by

statute for the offense in Count 5 is one to fifteen years
imprisonment.

I also understand that the offense carries a

maximum fine of $10,000.
COUNT 6
On June 2, 1989, in Cache County, Utah, acting as an
insurance agent, I represented to David Forsberg that I was
selling him an insurance policy.

On the date indicated, I

obtained a check payable to "Retired Persons Insurance" for
$1,039.00 from him for the policy.
to any insurance company.

I did not forward the money

At the time I obtained his money, I

knowingly did not tell him that I intended to use the money for
any purpose other than purchasing an insurance policy nor that
there was no such company by that name that was registered to
conduct insurance business in the State of Utah.

I acknowledge

that my failure to tell him that I intended to use the money for
other purposes and that no company by that name was registered to
conduct business in the State constituted a material omission,
and therefore I obtained the money through false pretenses or
through material omissions.
I understand the minimum and maximum sentence that
may be imposed upon me for the offense.

The penalty provided by

statute for the offense in Count 6 is one to fifteen years
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imprisonment.

I also understand that the offense carries a

maximum fine of $10,000.
5.

I am entering the guilty pleas voluntarily and

with the knowledge and understanding of the following:
a.

I know that I have the right to be represented by

an attorney and that an attorney will be appointed to represent
me by the Court at no cost to me if I cannot afford one.
b.

I have not waived my right to legal counsel.

My

attorneys are Arden Lauritzen and Barbara Lachmar and I have had
an opportunity to discuss this statement, my rights, and the
consequences of my guilty pleas with my attorneys prior to the
execution and filing of this statement and the entry of my guilty
pleas before this Court.
c.

I know that I have a right to a trial by jury and

that a unanimous verdict would be required for a conviction on
any count before a jury, and that by pleading guilty I waive my
right to a jury trial.
d.

I know that if I elect to have a trial, I have the

right to confront and cross-examine any witnesses who testify
against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorneys. I
also know that if I qualify as an indigent, I have the right to
have my witnesses subpoenaed at State expense to testify in court
upon my behalf.

I understand that I waive these rights by

pleading guilty.
e.

I know I have the right to testify in my own behalf

8

but that if I choose not to do so, I cannot be compelled to
testify or give evidence against myself and further realize that
no adverse inferences may or will be drawn against me if I elect
to exercise my right not to testify.

I also realize that by

pleading guilty I am waiving my right against self-incrimination
and am admitting that I am guilty.
f.

I know that if I wish to contest the charges

against me# I may enter a plea of "not guilty" and the matter
will be tried.

The State of Utah will have the burden of proving

each element of each count beyond a reasonable doubt.

I realize

that by pleading guilty I waive such rights, and that by my pleas
I am admitting all elements of the offenses to which I am
pleading guilty.
g.

I know that under the Constitution of the State of

Utah, if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by a judge, I
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the
Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, to the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah, and that if I could not afford to pay the
costs for such appeal, those costs would be paid by the state as
required by law.
h.

I know the minimum and maximum sentence that may be

imposed upon me for each offenses to which I enter a plea of
guilty, including the possibility of consecutive sentences. I
realize that the maximum possible sentence may be imposed upon me
by my pleas of guilty and that such sentences may be for
incarceration, fine, or a combination of both.

I also know that

9
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in addition to the imposition of any fine, an 85% surcharge as
required by S63-63a-l, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, will
be imposed and that I may be ordered by the Court to make
restitution to any victim or victims of my crimes.
i.

I know that incarceration may be imposed by the

Court to be served for consecutive periods for the counts to
which I plead guilty, that is, I may be ordered by the Court to
serve such sentences one after the other, rather than at the same
time.

I also know that if I am on probation, parole or awaiting

sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or
to which I have pleaded guilty, my pleas in the present action
may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
j.

I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving

my statutory and constitutional rights to file an appeal.
k.

I know that by entering pleas of guilty, I am

admitting and do so admit, that I have committed the conduct
alleged and that I am guilty of the crimes for which my pleas are
entered.

I further understand that I am pleading guilty

unconditionally and that I am not preserving any issue for appeal
relative to the Court's rulings on pre-trial motions or based
upon statutory or constitutional challenges in this case.
1.

My pleas of guilty are the result of a plea

negotiation conducted between my attorneys, on my behalf, and the
prosecutors, including the Utah Attorney General's Office and the
Cache County Attorney's Office.

The terms of the plea

negotiation are as follows:
10

In exchange for my pleas of guilty to 6 counts of
communications fraud# second degree felonies, the State will
recommend commitment to prison but will recommend that I receive
concurrent sentences on all 6 counts, and will further recommend
that the state sentences run concurrently with my federal
incarceration for 5 counts of mail fraud.

The State will further

recommend to the Utah Board of Pardons that I serve a total of
four years imprisonment with credit for time served since January
31# 1991/ the date I was sentenced by the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois for 5 counts of mail
fraud.

The State will further recommend that if I serve at least

two additional years in federal prison from this date, that I
need not be returned to the state of Utah but that I be permitted
to be placed on interstate parole.

I understand that the State

will recommend that appropriate restitution be ordered by the
Court.

Since I am presently before the Court pursuant to the

Interstate Agreement on Detainers, both parties understand that I
will be returned expeditiously to the custody of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons.

The State will recommend that the Court make

a specific finding that the I am not violent and have no
propensity for violent acts, and that the Court and the State of
Utah have no objection to my imprisonment in a minimum security
facility, my partaking in work programs, alternate housing
programs, halfway houses, and such other and further programs as
may be deemed beneficial to me based solely on the criteria
utilized by the Federal officials charged with my imprisonment
11
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and without regard to the sentence imposed by order of this
Court•
m.

I know that any plea negotiation with the

prosecution is not binding upon the Court and is subject to
approval by the Court,

I further realize, if sentencing

recommendations are allowed by the Court, including any promise
or concession as to sentencing made by the prosecutor, that such
recommendations are not binding upon the Court.

I also know that

any opinions which either of my attorneys, any of the
prosecutors, or any other person may have expressed to me as to
what they believe the Court may do with respect to sentencing are
not binding upon the Court.
6.

No threats, coercion, or unlawful or undue

influence of any kind have been made to induce me to enter a plea
of guilty and no promises other than as set forth in this
statement have been made to me.
7.

I have been advised of the time limits for filing

a motion to withdraw my plea of guilty, specifically, that under
S77-13-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, a request to
withdraw a plea of guilty must be made by motion within 30 days
after the entry of the plea.

I further understand that my pleas

may only be withdrawn upon a showing of good cause and with leave
of the Court.
8.

I have reviewed this statement with my attorneys

and I understand its provisions.

I have gone over it carefully

and have asked my attorneys to explain any words I may not have

12
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understood.

My attorneys have done so and I understand the

meaning of all the words and phrases contained within this
statement.

I am satisfied with this statement and agreement.
9.

I have received legal advice and assistance from my

attorneys and I am satisfied with such advice and assistance.
10.
through the

I am
/y*

years of age; I have attended school

grade and I can read and understand the

English language.
11.

I was not under the influence of any controlled

substance, drug, medication, or intoxicant when the decision to
enter the pleas was made.

I am not presently under the influence

of any controlled substance, drug, medication or intoxicant.
12.

I believe myself to be mentally capable of

understanding these proceedings and the consequences of this
statement and the entry of my pleas of guilty.

I am not

undergoing any counseling or treatment, mentally or medically,
which would impair or prevent me from knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily entering my pleas of guilty or executing and
filing this statement.
13.

I understand that this document sets out the

entire plea agreement between myself and the State of Utah.
DATED this

//Aday of \JtfLA4UJLJu^
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. 1993.

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEYS
We certify that we are the attorneys of record in this
matter for JACK D. BROCKSMITH, the above Defendant; that we know
he has read the statement and we have discussed it with him; and
that we believe that he fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent to execute it.
To the best of our knowledge and belief, after an appropriate
investigation/ the elements of the crimes and the factual
synopsis of the Defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated
and these, along with the other representations and declarations
made by the Defendant in the foregoing statement, are accurate
and true.

j&uJdofJf^

Barbara Lachmar/
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS
We certify that we are the prosecuting attorneys for
the State of Utah in this case against Jack D. Brocksmith, the
Defendant.

We have reviewed this statement of the Defendant and

find that the declarations, including the elements of the offense
of the charges and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's
criminal conduct which constitute the offenses, are true and
14
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correct.

No improper inducements/ threats or coercion to

encourage a plea have been offered the Defendant.

The plea

negotiations are fully contained in the statement or as
supplemented on the record before the Court.

There is reasonable

cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction
of the Defendant for the offenses for which the pleas are entered
and acceptance of the pleas would serve the public interest.

G2^^i7^^.

C. C. HORTON II
Assistant Attorney General

MICHAEL D. WIMS
Assistant Attorney General

G^U^.

GARY 0. MCKEAN
riey
Cache County Attorney

15

ORDER

Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing
statement and certification, and based upon my observation of the
Defendant in open court together with his responses made in open
court to questions put to him by the Court, the Court finds the
Defendant's pleas of guilty are freely and voluntarily made with
full knowledge of his rights and the consequences of pleading
guilty, and it is ordered that the Defendant's pleas of guilty to
the charges set forth in the statement be accepted and entered as
indicated.
DATED this

J/^y?i^^jf

/^d^y of

Gordon J. Low
District Court Judge
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ADDENDUM F
Defendant's Pro Se
Motion to Withdraw Pleas
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ADDENDUM G
Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion
to Withdraw Pleas and Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Pleas

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs.
CASE NO. 921000051
JACK D. BROCKSMITH,
Defendant

THIS MATTER IS BEFORE the Court upon the Defendant's Motion
for Leave to Withdraw his plea.

The Motion is supported by an

Affidavit received the 26th day of February 1£93.

The Court

having reviewed the pleadings in this matter, together with the
Affidavit, being cognizant of the circumstance surrounding the
entry of the plea and being aware of the plea negotiation, it
would

appear

matter, that
authorities

that

the

State

the Defendant
in

a

timely

did

was

act expeditiously

turned

fashion,

over

that

to

the

in .this
federal

transportation

was

provided by said federal authorities and was out of the hands
and

control

provided

of

the

by granting

State.

No

the Motion.

appropriate

relief could be

For the above reason and

those stated in the State's Response the Motion is denied.
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State vs. Brocksmith
#921000051
Page 2

Counsel for the State is directed to prepare a formal Order
in conformance herewith.
Dated this

c^f

Aa

?

of Mar

c h ' 1993.
BY THE COURT

>rdon J. Low
D i s t r i c t Court Judge
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JAN GRAHAM - 1231
Attorney General
C. C. HORTON II - 1542
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016
GARY o. M C K E A N -

I.I .1 ..«

( . .1 J

2201

Cache County Attorney
Attorney for the State of Utah
110 North 100 West
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 752-8920

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
VS •

• FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
| LAW, AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
]) MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA
i

JACK D. BROCKSMITH,

1 District Court No: 921000051
]I (Circuit Court No: 891001462)

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court upon the Defendant's pro se
motion to withdraw plea. The matter was considered by the Court ex
parte, at the request of the State, and having reviewed both the
motion, the State's response to that motion, and the Court's file,
the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law:

^JL

Case No
MiCRO FILMED

1

Aytf 2 9 1993

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Court finds that:

1.

There was no condition of the plea negotiation nor any

provision of the Judgment, Sentence and Commitment entered in this
matter that imposed any specific deadline on the State for the
transfer of the Defendant from the custody of the Cache County Jail
to federal authorities, nor for the transportation of the Defendant
to the Sandstone Federal Correctional Institution.
2.

Defendant fails to show good cause for the withdrawal of

his plea as required by §77-13-6(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended.
3.

Defendant's motion improperly raises issues regarding

allegations of violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
and his right to a speedy trial. Those matters had previously been
appropriately

and lawfully considered by this Court, and the

Defense motions with respect to those issues were lawfully denied.
4.

The Defendant, in fact, was transferred from the Cache

County Jail to federal authorities in timely fashion, and transported in the custody of the Federal Authorities, on February 5,
1993, four (4) days before the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw was
actually filed.
5. The State acted expeditiously in this matter.

2

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1*

The Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea is inadequate and

fails to meet the criteria required by §77-13-6(2) (a), Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended.
2.

Because of the Defendant's transfer and transportation

from the Cache County Jail prior to the filing of his motion, the
motion is moot.
3.

The Defendant fails to state any basis upon which the

relief requested may be granted, and therefore the Motion to
Withdraw should be denied.
4.

No appropriate relief can be provided by granting the

motion.
ORDER

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the Court has considered the matter ex p a r t e , a t the request
of the S t a t e ,

including a review of the Defendant's motion,

S t a t e ' s response t o t h a t motion, and the Court's

the

file.

Therefore, i t i s hereby ordered t h a t the Defendant's Motion
t o Withdraw Plea i s hereby denied.

DATED t h i si A
^^ddaayy of JWVUA/
/W^ff

1993.
BY THE COURT:

)0N J. LOW
S t r i c t Judge
3

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the proposed
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw was delivered this date to Arden
Lauritzen, Co-Counsel for Defendant, Barbara King Lachmar, CoCounsel for Defendant, at their respective mailboxes at the
District Court.
DATED this 29th day of April,

1993.

mfMn
Legal Assistant '
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea to Jack Brocksmith, Defendant,
at Sandstone Federal Correctional Institution, Sandstone, MN
55072.
DATED thisc£ff day of (J

)A//

, 1993.

ega/L A s s i s t a n t
Xec
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ADDENDUM H
Motion to Dismiss Charges

~
|

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

Jl

LOGAH DISTRICT
Case No. 891000111

State of UtablS

KM 15 iUaiirSI

V.

Jack D. Brocksmith
MOTION TO DISMISS CHARGES
Now comes the defendant, Jack D. Brocksmith, pro-se and requests
dismissal of all Utah charges. This motion is based on what the
United States Supreme Court has identified as Four Key Factors
which the court should consider in granting relief because of
violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution.

One: Length of Delay
The speedy trial right was attached when the formal charge
was made on 4 October 1989 runited States v. Marion [supra];
United States v. Lavasco 431 U.S. 783, 789 and 97 S.Ct. 2044
(1977)].

Although the defendant has been in custody of Utah

authorities since 11 July 1989 on an Illinois warrant, the
Supreme Court has ruled that "presently" imprisoned on another
charge and subject to criminal prosecution in another
jurisdiction might cause the court to conclude that the "accused"
is entitled to the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment [United
States v, Gouveia, 704 F.2d 1116, 1120 (9 Cir 1983)].

Thus the

defendant claims the protection of the Sixth Amendment since 11
July 1989.
A clearly tactical move by the State was done on 6 November
1989 when all charges were dropped.

Defendant was then held on

3/6

the Illinois warrant.

Then on 23 December 1989 the state refiled

charges against the defendant.
since that date.

These charges have been pendina

At no time during incarceration in Utah,

Illinois, or with federal authorities did defendant waive his
right to a speedy trial or protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The fact that I was incarcerated does not relieve a
jurisdiction where criminal charges were pending from its Sixth
Amendment duty:

United States Constitution, Amendment VI

Three

interests are protected by the Sixth Amendment right to speedy
trial:

first, defendant's interest in avoiding prolonged

imprisonment prior to trial; second, defendant's interest in
avoiding prolonged psychological pressure and public suspicion
while the charges are pending; and third, defendant's interest in
disposing of charges before his defense is lost (Piukev v.
Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1564 (1970); Smith v. Hooey, 393
U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575 (1969).)

Two: Reason for Delay
It will be clear that the prosecution purposefully delayed
trial to hamper defendant's defense and to gain a tactical
advantage.

The record is transparent on that point.

Such

tactics should weigh against the prosecution rBaker v. Wings. 407
UT 531] . Two tactical advantages gained by the prosecution in
delaying trial will be revealed later in this motion.

The court

can clearly see the State's advantage in havina a trial now
versus a trial when defendant was originally charged 4 October

w

1989.

Three: Assertion of the Speedy Trial Right
The defendant never waived his right to a speedy trial and,
in fact, formally demanded such a right while in custody in
Aledo, Illinois via the Interstate Detainer Act.

However, the

state rejected the demand because defendant had not been
convicted or sentenced.

This argument does not nullify

defendant's formal demand for a speedy trial.

The state has

known since the time of that request of defendant's demand for a
speedy trial and the assertion of this right is a matter of
record.

Such a demand adds significance to this motion.

fGlass

v. United States. 395 A»2d 802 (delay prior to assertion of
right); Bethea v. United States, 395 A.2d 787, 792 (D.C. Ct. App.
1978 (delay after assertion of right)? Reed v. United States, 383
A.2d 319.]
On 11 July 1990, exactly one year following his arrest and
having been incarcerated the entire time, defendant finally went
to trial on the Illinois charge of Theft by Deception.

He was

found not guilty of all but the misdemeanor charge of Deceptive
Practices.

The misdemeanor conviction is being appealed because

the statute of limitations had long since expired.
On 25 July 1990 the Mercer County Illinois Court sentenced
defendant to time served and defendant's attorney noted for the
record that defendant had served twice the time required by the
Illinois law.

The defendant was then immediately picked up on a

federal detainer.

X1A

On 9 August 1990 defendant was released on bond from federal
authorities and was free until he was convicted on 31 January
1991.

Despite the previous request for a speedy trial and the

charges that were apparently still pending, the State of Utah
made no move to detain defendant or bring him to trial. That
period of time was nine days short of six months.

Fourth: Prejudice
The defendant holds that the aforementioned three factors
demonstrate prejudicial behavior on the part of the State, but
beyond that, that such tactics and maneuvers clearly prejudiced
the defendant's case.

In October 1989 defendant had retained

counsel of his choice.

Judge Lowe himself commented that the

attorney, Mr. Hughes, was best suited to represent defendant
because of his knowledge of the case.

However, the defendant is

no longer in a position where he can retain private counsel (see
enclosed affidavit).
The defendant has thus been denied counsel of his choice due
to the maneuvers and tactics of the state.

The defendant's plea

of not guilty to the state charges still stands, but the state
has now gained a tactical advantage of tremendous importance
because on 31 January 1991 defendant was convicted of mail fraud.
The deceptive practice conviction would have been employed had
defendant testified in the federal trial to impeach his testimony
and it is clear that the State of Utah would follow suit in any
defense trial there.

314

It is therefore the assertion of the defendant that the
State has violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and also
the Utah Code 77-51-1 (1978). fBaker v. Wings, 407 U.S. 514, 925
S.Ct. 2182 (1972).]

That there can be no justification for the

delay and that the delay is not supported by the record gives
credibility to defendant's Motion for Dismissal of these Utah
charges.

It is further argued that the defense has been

prejudiced fEscobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478f 84 S.Ct. 1758
(1962) and United States v. Gouveia.1

It is further asserted

that this case meets the criteria of United States v. Lamasco,
431 U.S. 789; United States v. Marren, 404 U.S. 324-26; Fortaine
v. California, 390 U.S. 593f 595, 596, 88 S.Ct. 1229 (1968); and
Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 254 (D.C. Cir. 1956).

All of

these cases rule that if the prolonged delay adversely affects
defendant's ability to prepare, persevere, and present evidence
then his rights have been violated.
The defendant earnestly prays that the Honorable court will
grant relief on this matter.
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